

# Why the Intelligibles are not Outside the Intellect

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# Why the Intelligibles are not Outside the Intellect

Lloyd Gerson

In *Ennead* V 5 [32], Plotinus devotes the first two chapters to defending the thesis that the intelligibles are not outside Intellect, the second hypostasis of the Platonic system. In his *Life of Plotinus* §18, Porphyry says that at first he denied this thesis, but after three days of arguing with Amelius at the behest of Plotinus, Porphyry came around to seeing the truth of what Plotinus was claiming. Porphyry, no doubt, wanted to preserve the immutability and eternality of intelligibles in order to avoid any possibility that the manipulation of concepts or mental entities that we are plainly capable of might be supposed to be possible in the purely intelligible real. But he evidently came to see that it was not only possible but necessary that intelligibles should not be separated from their eternal intellection.

The provenance of this thesis of Plotinus has been well established and can be briefly sketched. In *Timaeus*, Plato does not explicitly say that the Forms are in the intellect that is the Demiurge, but he does say that (1) that he wanted to make the cosmos like himself (*παραπλήσια*) and (2) that he wanted to make the cosmos a likeness (*ὁμοιότητα*) of the Living Animal upon which the cosmos is modeled.<sup>1</sup> The implication is that by making the cosmos like the Living Animal, he thereby makes it like himself. So, the contents of the intellect that is the Demiurge must at least be like the contents of the Living Animal. It is natural for Platonists to think that this likeness is not that of an image in relation to its exemplar, that is, that the Demiurge has images of the Forms in his intellect, but rather that he has the Forms themselves. This is so because there are no images of Forms within the intelligible world. Images are all deficient in one way or another in relation to their originals. But if the Demiurge is immersed in images, then there can be no direct cognition of reality. This is an outcome that Plato (and Aristotle) regarded as self-refuting.

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<sup>1</sup> See *Tim.* 29E1-3, 30C2-D1. At 36E5-37A2, the Demiurge is said to be “the best among intelligibles and the things that always exist” (τῶν νοητῶν ἀεὶ τε ὄντων ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀρίστου). This seems to emphasize the identity of the Demiurge with the Living Animal.

Second, Aristotle tells us that he approves of the view that “the soul is the place of forms,” adding, however, that it is not the whole soul, but only the thinking part, and that the soul is only forms potentially, not actually. This seems to be a reference to the *Timaeus* passages just mentioned, not to the view criticized in *Parmenides*.<sup>2</sup> Aristotle’s point concerns primarily forms in sensibles. The thinking part of the embodied soul is indeed only potentially these. If, however, there were separate Forms, then the reasons for believing that they are “internal” to an intellect would be ones with which Aristotle would agree, as is evident from the next point and from Plotinus’ analysis of the issue.

Third, Aristotle adds the insight that in intellection, the intellect is identical with its intelligible objects.<sup>3</sup> If this is so, then Platonists would be encouraged to think that the primary Intellect would be identical with its intelligible objects, that is, that they would not be outside of it. The Platonic and Aristotelian accounts of intellection and intelligibles are joined in Middle Platonism, for example, in Alcinous, in the doctrine that Forms are divine thoughts (νοήματα).<sup>4</sup> One complication with this is that Plotinus, precisely because he agrees that Intellect and intelligibles are inseparable, denies what Platonists like Alcinous claim, namely, that Intellect is the first principle of all. I will, though, not be concerned with this side of the story. Rather, I want to focus on the philosophical argument for the thesis that Porphyry at first rejected out of hand, that intelligibles are not outside Intellect. And then I will turn to the startling implication of this thesis, namely, that Being is, as Plotinus says, a one-many, a conclusion that, from *Parmenides* to Aristotle to Hegel, is taken to be rank nonsense for the obvious reason that if Being is many, then, as Plato himself suggests in *Sophist*, we still face the question of the being that the many share.<sup>5</sup> In

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<sup>2</sup> See *De an.* Γ 4, 429a27-29. Aristotle does not say that he is thinking of Plato specifically, although the reason given by some scholars for believing that he is not thinking of Plato is not persuasive. At *Parm* 132B-C, *Parmenides* rejects the view advanced by Socrates that Forms are “thoughts” (νοήματα) in the mind. Plato’s reasons for thinking that Forms are in, that is, are identical with, the intellect of the Demiurge are not contradicted by saying that Forms are not concepts. For as the *Parmenides* passage emphasizes, concepts are *of* Forms.

<sup>3</sup> See *De an.* Γ 4, 429b9, 430a2-3, 5, 430a9-20, 7, 431a1-2, b17, 8, 3-4.

<sup>4</sup> See e.g., *Didask.* 9.1-2; Atticus, fr. 26 Des Places. It is possible that Alcinous believed that the rejection of the claim that Forms are thoughts in *our* intellects did not entail that they could not be thoughts in a divine intellect.

<sup>5</sup> See *Soph.* 242B-244B.

other words, we face the question of why being could be other than one.

Plotinus advances several arguments for his thesis, but I will focus on what he calls “the greatest objection” against the claim that the intelligibles *are* outside the Intellect.<sup>6</sup>

But the greatest objection is this. If indeed one were to grant that these intelligibles are totally outside Intellect, and then claim that Intellect contemplates them as such, it necessarily follows that it does not itself have the truth of these things and that it is deceived in all that it contemplates; for it is those intelligibles that would be the true reality. So, it will contemplate them though it does not have them, instead receiving reflections of them in a kind of cognition like this. Not having true reality, then, but rather receiving for itself reflections of the truth, it will have falsities and nothing true. So, if it knows that it has falsities, it will agree that it has no share in truth. But if it is ignorant of this as well, and thinks that it has the truth when it does not, the falsity that is generated in it is double, and that will separate it considerably from the truth.

The claim that if the intelligibles are outside Intellect, it “does not itself have the truth of these things” seems embarrassingly question-begging. For either the words “have the truth” just mean that the intelligible are *inside* Intellect in which case the argument is circular or else they mean something else, but why in the world would we suppose that they supply a reason for thinking that the intelligible are not outside Intellect?

In order to begin to appreciate the point that Plotinus is making, let us first be clear that the “truth” that Plotinus is here speaking of is ontological truth, not semantical truth. He is referring to the truth that

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<sup>6</sup> V 5 [32], 1, 50-62: Μέγιστον δὲ πάντων ἐκεῖνο· εἰ γὰρ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα δοίη τις ταῦτα ἔξω εἶναι καὶ τὸν νοῦν αὐτὰ οὕτως ἔχοντα θεωρεῖν, ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ μήτε τὸ ἀληθὲς αὐτῶν ἔχειν διεψεῦσθαι τε ἐν ἅπασιν οἷς θεωρεῖ. Τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθινὰ ἂν εἶη ἐκεῖνα· θεωρήσει τοίνυν αὐτὰ οὐκ ἔχων αὐτά, εἶδωλα δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν τῇ γνώσει τῇ τοιαύτῃ λαβῶν. Τὸ τοίνυν ἀληθινὸν οὐκ ἔχων, εἶδωλα δὲ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς παρ’ αὐτῷ λαβῶν τὰ ψευδῆ ἔξει καὶ οὐδὲν ἀληθές. Εἰ μὲν οὖν εἰδήσει, ὅτι τὰ ψευδῆ ἔχει, ὁμολογήσει ἄμοιρος ἀληθείας εἶναι· εἰ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἀγνοήσει καὶ οἰήσεται τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔχειν οὐκ ἔχων, διπλάσιον ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ ψεῦδος γενόμενον πολὺ τῆς ἀληθείας αὐτὸν ἀποστήσει.

the Idea of the Good provides the Forms with.<sup>7</sup> He is not referring to a property of propositions or sentences. Ontological truth is a relational property of intelligibles, that is, the property of being perspicuous to or accessible by an intellect.<sup>8</sup> Even so, one wants to know why ontological truth must be inside Intellect as opposed to being only inside the Forms as provided by the Good.

In order to answer *this* question of why this must be so, let us recall those passages in *Phaedo*, *Sophist*, and elsewhere where Plato speaks about relations among the Forms. For example in *Phaedo* we learn that 5 is an odd number, and in *Sophist* we learn that there is a “community,” (κοινωνία) of Forms or a “plaiting” (σμπλοκή) of Forms without which there could be no semantical truth or even no discourse.<sup>9</sup> The metaphors of connectedness or association are seductive but opaque. For Forms are immutable, immaterial entities, “monads” in the language of *Philebus*, and all the metaphors of connection are drawn from the sensible world where connections are based on spatial or temporal contiguity and are all external relations. Without space and time, we have no easy grasp on how two intelligible can be connected.

We come a step closer to the real issue when we distinguish external relations from internal relations. In the former case, when A and B are externally related, then either A or B can exist without the other; in the latter, if A and B are internally related, then it is not possible to “remove” one without removing the other whether this be symmetrically or asymmetrically. So, if 5 is odd, it is not possible to remove the oddness from 5, though it is also the case that 3 is internally related to odd even though 5 and 3 are not internally related in the identical way. Contrast the color spectrum. Crimson is necessarily darker than pink, but it is not internally related to pink because if pink were to disappear owing perhaps to some anomaly in the laws of physics, crimson would remain exactly the color it is.

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<sup>7</sup> See *Rep.* 508E1-4 with 508A9-B7, 509B6, 517C2-3. Also see Aristotle, *Meta.* Θ 10 on ontological truth.

<sup>8</sup> By contrast, that which is not intelligible and so is bereft of ontological truth, like matter, is not available to an intellect. This is not to say, of course, that matter does not exist, but only that it is not thinkable. That is why Aristotle says that it is knowable only by analogy and Plato says that it is available only to a “bastard type of reasoning”.

<sup>9</sup> See the “cleverer hypothesis” in *Phd.* 105C2ff; *Soph.* 254E4: συμμειγνυμένω μὴν ἐκείνοις ἐξ ἀνάγκης αἰεὶ, making the point explicitly.

So, we want internal relations, but there is an obvious problem. And it is that, on most theories of internal relations, if A and B are internally related, that is because there is an essential connection between the two. That is, “B” somehow or other expresses what A is or vice versa. The problem, of course, is that if a Form is a “monad” or an eternal unique individual οὐσία, then how can *another* Form be part of its essence?<sup>10</sup> It is tempting to say, and it is not entirely false to say, that indeed all the intelligibles are parts of Being (τὸ ὄν). But this is clearly inadequate for at least two very good reasons. First, even if it were true, that would not advance us one step toward understanding why the intelligibles—or Being—must be inside Intellect. After all, Plotinus himself says that intelligible must in one sense be prior to Intellect.<sup>11</sup> Thus, the Form of Horse must exist for Intellect to think it; it does not exist by thinking it. Second, and independent of our problem about the internality of intelligibles, for all the Forms to be “parts” of Being either leaves them as distinct parts, in which case the problem is unresolved or else they are indistinct in which case we would have to agree that if something is a triangle because it partakes of the Form of Triangularity, it is also a grapefruit because the Form of Grapefruit is not distinct from the Form of Triangularity. So, we do want internal relatedness, but along with that we want distinctness among intelligibles. That is precisely where Intellect comes in.

Consider the following examples. We come to understand that the Morning Star and the Evening Star are in fact identical, that they are the planet Venus. We come to understand that the person we see at  $t_1$  is identical to the person we see at  $t_2$ . To put it more precisely, although S-at-  $t_1$  cannot be formally identical to S-at- $t_2$  since they do not have identical properties, still we understand that they are identical nevertheless. The first takeaway from this analysis relevant to our main question is that we need a concept of identity that is not formal identity in order to be able to *re-identify* things or, in the first example, in order to be able to identify the subject of non-identical manifestations or appearances. Insisting on the univocity of “identity” as most contemporary philosophers do, is metaphysically maladroit and so unacceptable to Platonists. Formal identity does not even begin to help us to understand what it means to *re-identify* anything.

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<sup>10</sup> See *Phd.* 78C6-7 where the Forms are said to be ἀσύνητα, that is, incomposites. This would seem to preclude the compositeness entailed by having an essence that is in part expressed by another Form.

<sup>11</sup> See e.g., VI 6 [34] 6.

Consider one further example that makes the point about identity even clearer. We all know that  $A=A$ , the symbolization of formal identity. But every substantive equation is of the form  $A=B$ , which must indicate some type of identity other than formal identity, since the only thing  $A$  is formally identical with is  $A$ . Let us for the moment just call this non-formal identity or metaphysical identity. It is clearly non-formal identity that is needed among eternal intelligibles in order to guarantee necessary truths.

A final pair of examples of a somewhat different cast comes from Aristotle. In a canonical Aristotelian demonstration, the middle term is the definition of the subject and it is what “connects” the subject to its commensurately universal predicates. Thus, all triangles are three-angled because a triangle is a three-sided plane figure and all three-sided plane figures are three-angled. “Being a triangle” does not mean the same thing as “being three-angled” and yet, through the definition, we see—intellectually see—that what is a triangle and what is three-angled are extensionally equivalent. And we need only add here that for intelligible entities extensionality adds nothing to intensionality, or denotation adds nothing to connotation.

The second example is a distinction that Aristotle frequently makes between  $A$  and  $B$  that are identical in εἶναι, but distinct in λόγος. So, teaching and learning are identical in being but distinct in their essence or account.<sup>12</sup> Teaching and learning are really distinct *quoad nos*; in reality they are identical. But if that identity were formal identity, they could not be really distinct in any sense.

The next point is that the recognition or understanding that two or more appearances or manifestations are non-formally identical, meaning that there is one thing that the two or more really are, is entirely a cognitional act. That is, it occurs entirely within intellect. After all, the planet Venus is just the planet Venus whether it is morning or evening. It—the very same planet—is only the Morning Star and the Evening Star to an intellect. So, too, the number 3 is just the number three even if we come to understand that it is equal to the square root of the number 9. So, it is intellect that holds together the manifestations of that which is one or self-identical. It holds them together as manifestations of that one thing.

If intelligibles were outside Intellect, then there would be no ontological foundation for the fact that the proposition that “5 is odd”

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<sup>12</sup> See e.g., *Phys.* Γ 3, 202b16-22.

is not just true but necessarily true. It is not undifferentiated Being that makes this true. It is not an array of distinct Forms that makes this true, but rather it is Intellect thinking eternally that the Form of Five and the Form of Odd are really manifestations of Being that makes it true. Just as “the Morning Star is the Evening Star” is an intentional object and not a real object, so the ontological foundation for our propositional claim “5 is odd” is an intentional object for Intellect, not a real object, meaning that if it were, it would have an ὑπόστασις outside of or external the Intellect. Plotinus is quite clear that the ὑπόστασις, what has independent existence, is Intellect-Being, not an independent array of Forms.

Thus, we can better understand Plotinus when he writes in VI 7 [38],

It is not possible, therefore, for Beings to be if Intellect does not activate them, and it activates one thing after another, and in a way wandering all wanderings, wandering in itself, just as it is the nature of true Intellect to wander in itself. It naturally wanders among Substances, as the Substances run along its wanderings with it. Intellect is everywhere itself. It, then, has a constant wandering. Its wandering is on ‘the plain of truth’, which it does not leave.<sup>13</sup>

The “plain of truth” which comes from *Phaedrus* is Being as cognized. That is why the property of ontological truth is a relational property, that of being for an intellect.<sup>14</sup> More particularly, it is the property of being in relational to an eternal intellect, either the hypostasis Intellect or our own undescended intellects. Ontological truth does not just make intelligibles knowable; it make them known. They are internally related to Intellect. It is this property which the Good, as One, gives to intelligible reality because the One is virtually all that is intelligible. The source or principle (ἀρχή) of truth must transcend truth, that is, it must transcend intelligibility. And yet it must somehow “have” that which it gives, as is the case with any cause and its effects. What the One is virtually is all intelligibles, meaning that the unity that

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<sup>13</sup> VI 7 [38], 13.28-37: Οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα τὰ ὄντα εἶναι μὴ νοῦ ἐνεργήσαντος, ἐνεργήσαντος δὲ ἀεὶ ἄλλο μετ’ ἄλλο καὶ οἷον πλανηθέντος πᾶσαν πλάνην καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ πλανηθέντος, οἷα νοῦς ἐν αὐτῷ ὁ ἀληθινὸς πέφυκε πλανᾶσθαι· πέφυκε δ’ ἐν οὐσίαις πλανᾶσθαι συνθεουσῶν τῶν οὐσιῶν ταῖς αὐτοῦ πλάναις. Πανταχοῦ δ’ αὐτός ἐστι· μένουσαν οὖν ἔχει τὴν πλάνην. Ἡ δὲ πλάνη αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ τῆς ἀληθείας πεδίῳ, οὗ οὐκ ἐκβαίνει.

<sup>14</sup> See *Phdr.* 248B6.



Intellect sees among all the Forms (e.g.,  $A=B$  for any  $A$  and any  $B$ ) is the intelligible λόγος of the first principle of all.

We are now, I hope, in a position to see why Plotinus maintained that Being is identical with Intellect and that it is a one-many, as opposed to Soul which is a one *and* many.<sup>15</sup> Against Aristotle and in line with Plato, Plotinus thinks that οὐσία is essentially complex. That is why the first principle of all, which must be simple, is ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας. The “oneness” is owing to the cognitive identity of Intellect and Being, the claim of Parmenides that Plotinus quotes or alludes to about six times.<sup>16</sup> The “manyness” is owing to the distinctness of Intellect and Being and also the distinctness among the intelligibles.<sup>17</sup> The main point relevant to the topic of this paper is that the oneness and the manyness are inseparable. In the activity (ἐνέργεια) of thinking, Intellect thinks all that is thinkable as a many that is also one. This many-one is what οὐσία is.<sup>18</sup>

We can perhaps get a better sense of what this primary unifying activity is if we compare it with the thinking of embodied intellects.<sup>19</sup> Regarding the latter, Plotinus says,

But how are we related to the Intellect? By 'Intellect' I do not mean that condition that the soul derives from the entities that accompany the Intellect, but the Intellect itself. In fact, we have this even though it transcends us. But we have it either collectively or individually, or both collectively and individually. We have it collectively, because it is indivisible and one, that is, everywhere identical; we have it individually, because each one of us has the whole of it in the primary part of the soul. We have

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<sup>15</sup> On Intellect as one-many see IV 8 [6], 3.10; V 1 [10], 8.26; V 3 [49], 15.11; VI 2 [43], 2.2; VI 2, 10.11; VI 2, 15.14; VI 2, 21.7; VI 2, 22.10; VI 5 [23], 6.1-2; VI 6 [34], 8.22; VI 6, 13.52-53; VI 7 [38], 8.17-18; VI 7, 14.11-12; VI 7, 39.11-14.

<sup>16</sup> See Parmenides, fr. B3 Diels: τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἔστιν τε καὶ εἶναι.

<sup>17</sup> See III 9 [13] 1, 13-14, where Plotinus insists on the distinction between τὸ νοητόν and τὸ νοοῦν.

<sup>18</sup> See VI 9 [9] 2, 21-27; V 6 [24] 6, 20-24. At V 1 [10] 4, 33-40, Plotinus makes it clear that thinking requires difference (ἐτερότης) (between thinking and object of thinking) and identity (ταυτότης) between thinking and object of thinking. Hence, Intellect and Being are many-one. The identity does not contradict the difference because the One alone is unqualifiedly self-identical. The identity of Intellect with Being entails the manyness of both.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. Plato, *Rep.* 537B8-C8 where the educational goal of the rulers is to bring what they learned “into a unified vision” (εἰς σύνοψιν).

the Forms, then, in two ways: in the soul, in a way, unfolded and separated, but in Intellect altogether.<sup>20</sup>

The unfolded and separated Forms are the intelligible objects of our embodied cognition. They are the elements of our universalizing thinking. They are λόγοι of Being, eternally cognitively identical with Intellect. That is, they are expressions of Intellect at the level of Soul. So, when we grasp that “five is odd” we are representing Being in our discursive, embodied intellects as mediated by Intellect. That the intelligibles are not outside Intellect means that we could not grasp the necessary truth that five is odd if, *per impossibile*, Intellect did not exist. In that counterfactual condition, we would have no way of grasping that five is odd rather than even since the relation among five and odd and even would be indistinguishable within Being.<sup>21</sup>

It is important to realize that for Plotinus and for the entire Platonic tradition, grasping that five is odd is not primarily a matter of memory or residual sense-experience or rule acquisition or successful symbol manipulation. It is rather a matter of seeing what is really there to be seen. And what is there to be seen is not a picture of the number five or a symbol for oddness. It is seeing as necessarily connected five and odd. And the necessary connectedness is guaranteed by Intellect for whom the array of Forms in their articulated interconnectedness is what Being really is.<sup>22</sup>

If Plotinus is correct in insisting that the intelligibles are not outside Intellect, then this means that whether we identify Intellect with the Demiurge or the Unmoved Mover (or both, as Plotinus does), then

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<sup>20</sup> I 1 [53], 8.1-8: Πρὸς δὲ τὸν νοῦν πῶς; Νοῦν δὲ λέγω οὐχ ἦν ἡ ψυχὴ ἔχει ἕξιν οὐσαν τῶν παρὰ τοῦ νοῦ, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸν τὸν νοῦν. Ἡ ἔχομεν καὶ τοῦτον ὑπεράνω ἡμῶν. Ἐχομεν δὲ ἢ κοινὸν ἢ ἴδιον, ἢ καὶ κοινὸν πάντων καὶ ἴδιον· κοινὸν μὲν, ὅτι ἀμέριστος καὶ εἷς καὶ πανταχοῦ ὁ αὐτός, ἴδιον δὲ, ὅτι ἔχει καὶ ἕκαστος αὐτὸν ὅλον ἐν ψυχῇ τῇ πρώτῃ. Ἐχομεν οὖν καὶ τὰ εἶδη διχῶς, ἐν μὲν ψυχῇ οἷον ἀνελιγμένα καὶ οἷον κεχωρισμένα, ἐν δὲ νῶ ὁμοῦ τὰ πάντα.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Plato, *Tht.* 186B-D, where Socrates argues that we cannot attain truth without attaining οὐσία. But in attaining οὐσία, we do not attain to undifferentiated Being.

<sup>22</sup> See W. Mesch, “Die ontologische Bedeutung der Zeit in Platons *Timaeus*, in *Interpreting the Timaeus-Critias*. Proceedings of the IV Symposium Platonicum. Edited by T. Calvo and L. Brisson (Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag, 1997), 234-5, on the necessity that the necessary interconnectedness among Forms requires that the Forms be alive, that is, they they be cognitively identical with the life of an eternal intellect. Also, P.F. Finck, *Die Begründung der Seele im absoluten Denken* (Leiden: Brill, 2012), ch.4.

Platonic metaphysics cannot be usefully separated from Platonic theology, at least insofar as we think that an eternal Intellect is part of the subject matter for theology. This will no doubt come as a big surprise to contemporary mathematical Platonists who argue that there are indeed mathematical objects and mathematical facts outside of space and time, but who, generally, vociferously deny that their existence requires an eternal Intellect to contemplate them in their diverse unity.<sup>23</sup> The grounds for radically separating Platonism from theology is that Platonism operates solely within the realm of formal causality, while theology inevitably enters the picture as the foundation for teleological explanation. If Plotinus is right, it is not possible to have the one without the other. But of course, just as formal causality does not exist apart from teleological or final causality so both formal and final causality do not exist apart from efficient causality. So, from fixing the ontological foundation for necessary truth, we then see the need to introduce Intellect and, then, we see the need to introduce the Good or One, the first principle of all and that upon which everything depends for its existence. The consequence of denying this admittedly elaborate, though authentically Platonic, metaphysical framework is nothing less than accepting that “5 is odd” or “a tangent touches a circle at one and only one point” are *not* necessary and eternal truths. That would be expensive.

If the above interpretation is correct, it enables us to see the One, Intellect, and intelligibles as integrated and inseparable elements of the Platonic system. Aristotle was right to conclude that there must be a first principle of all and that it must be absolutely simple. Further, he was right to locate primary Being in an intellect. But in so doing, he misidentified this intellect with the absolutely simple first principle of all. As Plotinus argues, Being must indeed be one. But its oneness is that of a complex array of all that is intelligible. The oneness that it has is provided by that which is unqualifiedly simple and so its oneness is different from that. The oneness that Being has is, however, also not that of a “sum” or “whole” where each part is related to the rest only by an external relation. Its oneness is that of a many-seen-as-one. This “seeing” is the paradigm of all intellection wherein one sees that, say,  $A=B$  means that “A” and “B” are two expressions of one thing. So, the intelligible world cannot be separated from eternal Intellect which is just to say that the intelligibles are not outside it.

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<sup>23</sup> E.g., J. Brown, *Platonism, Naturalism, and Mathematical Knowledge* (New York: Routledge, 2012), pg. 161, says, “I’ve actually never seen the slightest connection between religion and mathematical Platonism.”

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