


Hermeas on the Phaedrus



Extracts translated by Thomas Taylor

Hermeas on the Phaedrus

245c "In the first place, it must be enquired about what kind of soul Plato is speaking. For some, among which is the Stoic Posidonius, are of the opinion that it is alone about the soul of the world, because it is said *πασα*, and it is added a little after, 'all heaven and all generation falling together must stop.' But others say, that it is simply concerning every soul, so as to include the soul of an ant, and a fly. And this was the opinion of Harpocration. For he understands the word *πασα*, as pertaining to every soul. If however, it be requisite neither to restrict the problem, nor to extend it simply to all animals, we must assume from Plato himself, what kind of soul it is, of which he is now speaking. He says therefore, that it is necessary in the first place to speak about the nature of soul both the divine and the human, *ie.* about every rational soul; so that the present discourse is concerning the rational soul. To which we may add, that the ancients are accustomed to call the rational soul, that which is properly soul. For they call that which is above it, intellect, and that which is beneath it, not simply soul, but the irrational life, or the animation of the spirit, the life which is distributed about bodies, and the like. But they denominated the rational part that which is properly soul. For Plato also calls the rational soul, that which is properly man. He previously, however, enunciates the conclusion, since he is about to make the demonstrations, from things which are essentially inherent in the soul, and which pertain to it, so far as it is soul. On this account therefore, he first enunciates the conclusion, indicating by so doing that the *διότι*, or *the why*, is contractedly comprehended in the *οτι*,[†] or *the that*. For the soul possesses the immortal from its essence. Hence, prior to the evolved, divided, and expanded demonstration, he gives the contracted and that which contains *the why* together with *the that*.[‡] But there are here, two demonstrative syllogisms, through which the immortality of the soul is demonstrated, and which directly prove that it is so; and there is also another syllogism, which demonstrates this, through a deduction to an impossibility. Why, however, is there this number of syllogisms? For the intention of Plato, was not simply to adduce a multitude of arguments, since in this case he would have employed many others, as he does in the *Phædo*; but he employs such as are adapted to each subject of discussion. For now, as we have already observed, he adduces arguments derived from the essence of the soul, and from things which are essentially inherent in it. In answer to this it must be said, that since it is proposed to demonstrate that the soul is immortal, if we see how many modes there are of corruption, and show that the soul is not corrupted according to any one of these, we shall then have demonstrated that it is incorruptible and indestructible, and it will also be evident that it is immortal. For every thing that is corrupted, is corrupted in a twofold respect. For either it is itself corrupted by itself, through the matter which it contains, or it is corrupted externally. Thus for instance wood, by alone lying on the ground, is corrupted through the putrefaction which is in itself: for it contains in itself the cause of its corruption; as Plato also says in the *Republic*, that every thing which is corrupted, is corrupted by its own appropriate evil. But it may also be corrupted externally, by being burnt, and cut. Since, therefore, there are two modes of corruption, on this account Plato adduces two syllogisms. For one of these demonstrates, that the soul is not corrupted by itself, which he shows through its being self-moved and perpetually moved; but the other syllogism demonstrates that neither is the soul corrupted by any thing else, which he shows through its being the principle of motion.

Shall we say, therefore, that each of these syllogisms is imperfect, but that the demonstration derives its perfection from both? Or shall we say, that in either of them the other is comprehended, but that the peculiarity of each, previously presents itself to the view? For that which is not corrupted by itself, cannot be corrupted by another thing. For having itself in itself, the cause of preserving itself, and always being present with itself, how can it be corrupted by any thing else? For that which is self-motive is a thing of this kind, as will be demonstrated. And how can that which is not corrupted by another thing, but is the principle and cause of other things being preserved, be corrupted by itself? For the principle of motion will be demonstrated to be a thing of this kind. For neither will it be corrupted by the things which are above it, since it is preserved by them, nor by the things posterior to itself, since it is the cause of their being and life. If, therefore, it cannot be corrupted by any thing, how, since it is the fountain of life, can it be corrupted by itself? Hence, as we have said, each of the arguments is of itself perfect, and comprehends in itself the other. But one of them shows, and is characterized by this, that the

[†] For *τ_οτι* here, it is necessary to read *τ_οτι*.

[‡] The same reading as the above, must also be adopted here.

soul is not corrupted by itself; and the other by this, that the soul is not corrupted by any other thing. Let us however, in the first place, arrange the propositions of the syllogisms, and afterwards consider the development of them.

The first syllogism therefore, is as follows: The soul is self-moved. That which is self-moved is perpetually moved. That which is perpetually moved is immortal. The soul, therefore, is immortal. Hence this reasoning shows us that the soul is not corrupted by itself. But the second syllogism is, the soul is self-moved. That which is self-moved is the principle of motion. The principle of motion is unbegotten. The unbegotten is incorruptible. The incorruptible is immortal. The soul, therefore, is immortal. And this reasoning demonstrates to us that the soul is not corrupted by a certain other thing. The truth of the assumptions, therefore, we shall accurately discuss in what follows. But now considering the first and common proposition of the two syllogisms by itself, that the soul is self-moved, and which Plato arranges in the last place of the whole reasoning, let us survey how that which is self-moved is the first of things that are moved, especially since no casual man[†] doubts concerning the existence of the self-motive essence. And perhaps it will be found that the philosophers do not dissent from each other. For Aristotle indeed takes away all corporeal motions from the soul, which we also say is most true. But Plato clearly shows that the motions of the soul are different from all the corporeal motions. For he says in the tenth book of the *Laws*, "that soul conducts every thing in the heavens, the earth, and the sea, by its motions, the names of which are *to will, to consider, to attend providentially to other things, to consult, to opine rightly and falsely, together with rejoicing, grieving, daring, fearing, hating and loving.*" That there is, therefore, a certain principle of motion, and that it is that which is self-moved, will be from hence evident. For as it is manifest that there is that which is alter-motive, this will either be moved by another alter-motive nature, and that by another, and so on to infinity; or alter-motive natures will move each other in a circle, so that the first will again be moved by the last; or, if it is not possible that either of these modes can take place, it is necessary that the self-motive nature must have the precedency. It is evident, therefore, that motive natures cannot proceed to infinity: for neither is there the infinite in essence, nor is there any science of infinities. But neither is it possible for motive natures to be in a circle. For the order of beings would be subverted, and the same thing would be both cause and effect; so that it is necessary there should be a certain principle of motion, and that motion should neither be to infinity, nor in a circle. This principle of motion, however, which, according to both the philosophers, is soul, Plato says is self-moved, but Aristotle immovable.

But that it is necessary this principle of motion should be demonstrated to be self-moved, even from the dogmas of Aristotle, you may learn from hence. In all beings nature does not proceed without a medium from a contrary to a contrary, as, for instance, from winter to summer; but it is entirely requisite that a medium should precede, at one time spring, and at another time autumn; and the like takes place in all bodies and incorporeal essences. Here, likewise, as there is the alter-motive and immovable nature, it is necessary there should be a medium which is the self-moved essence, being one and the same in number, and in subject. For that which Aristotle calls the self-moved nature, as, for instance, the animal, is not that which is now proposed for investigation. For the animal, according to him, being composed of the immovable and the alter-motive, he says that the whole is self-moved. So that, as there is that which is entirely immovable, such, for instance, as the principle of all things, and as there is that which is alter-motive, such as bodies, there will be between them the self-moved nature, which will be nothing else than soul. For that which we see moved by it, this we say is animated, so that this is the very nature of soul, itself to move itself. There are, therefore, these three things according to Aristotle, *viz.* intellect, life, and being; and in the first place, that we may speak of being, as there is something which is generated from another thing and which receives existence from another, there is also that which imparts existence to itself, such as the heaven and intellects, which he says always exist unbegotten by any other cause. For, according to him they are neither generated by a cause, as neither are they generated in time, but they are always unbegotten, and the causes of existence to themselves. And again, in life there is that which receives life from other things, for man generates man; and there are also things which have life from themselves, such as again, the heaven and intellect. For they have not an adscititious, but a connascent life. Farther still, as there are things which receive from others the power of intellectual perception, and become through them intellectual, as the intellect which is in capacity, according to Aristotle, there is also intellect which is in energy, which possesses from itself intellectual perception, and intellectually perceives itself.[†] Hence from all this it follows, that as there is that which is moved by another

[†] *ie.* Aristotle.

[†] And this intellect in energy is the medium between the intelligible, properly so called, which is superior to intellect, and the intellect which is in capacity.

thing, there is also necessarily that which is the cause to itself of being moved, and imparts self-motion to itself. For, otherwise, it would be absurd to pass entirely from the alter-motive to the immovable without assuming that which is self-moved as the medium, in the same manner as it is absurd to pass from that which is generated, and which only sometimes exists, to that which is super-essential non-being, without assuming being as the medium. For it will be immanifest what kind of non-being we assume, whether that which is inferior to a generated nature, or that which is superior to it, unless we assume the intermediate nature, which is eternal being. Thus, likewise, in motion, it will be immanifest, what kind of the immovable we assume, whether that which is subordinate, or that which is superior to the alter-motive nature, unless the self-moved is assumed as a medium. And the like takes place in life, intellect, and other things.

This self-motive motion, therefore, is demonstrated by the philosopher in the *Laws*, to be the first principle of all other motions, and the cause of them according to all the significations of cause. For it is the effective, the paradigmatic, and the final cause of them, which are alone properly causes. For the formal cause is in the effect, and is the effect itself. And the material cause is much more remote from being properly cause; since it has the relation of things without which others are not effected.[‡] Hence, that the self-moved nature is the effective cause of other motions is evident, as Plato demonstrates in the *Laws*. "For if all things," says he "should stand still, what would that be which would be first moved?" Is it not evident that it must be the self-moved nature? For if that which accedes to the motive cause is moved, and all other beings are alter-motive,[§] but that which is self-motive possesses in itself a motive power, and does not merely approximate to it, but is united to it, or rather, has motion for its essence, it is evident that this, being first moved, will move other things. For as, if the sun did not set and rise, but was immovable, we should be dubious what is the cause of so great a light, and if he were invisible to the things which he illuminates, we should be still more dubious; thus also, with respect to the soul, since being incorporeal it is the cause of all motions, it occasions us to doubt how this is effected. As, therefore, the sun who illuminates all things, much more makes himself luminous, thus, likewise, the soul, which moves all things by a much greater priority, moves itself. For every cause begins its energy from itself; and you will find that the motions of the soul are the paradigms of corporeal motions.

Let us then assume the corporeal motions; but these are eight in number, being rather passive than effective; *viz.* generation, corruption, increase, diminution, lation, circulation, mixture, and separation. In soul, therefore, there is increase, when giving itself to more excellent natures it multiplies its intellections. But there is then corruption in it; when departing from thence it becomes more imbecile, and more sluggish in its intellectual perceptions. Again, generation takes place in it when it ascends from this terrene abode.[†] But the corruption of it is its last lapse from the intelligible. And mixture, indeed, in it, is collected intelligence, and at the same time the contemplation of forms. But separation in it may be said to be a more partial intelligence, and the contemplation of one form only. Again, lation in the soul is the motion of it according to a right line, and into the realms of generation. But circulation in it is its periodic revolution about forms, its evolution, and its restitution to the same condition. Circulation, therefore, may be more appropriately assigned to divine souls, but lation to ours. You may also perceive in divine souls both these motions. For the Demiurgus, says Plato in the *Timæus*, taking two right lines, bent them into a circle. Hence it is evident that the circular inflection and intelligence of souls is not without the right line. For it pertains to intellect alone to be purely moved in a circle. But the ninth motion, which is that of incorporeal natures about bodies, such as calefactions, or refrigerations, or animations, has a paradigmatic cause in the soul, so far as the soul gives life to bodies.

And thus we have sufficiently shown that there are motions of souls, which are the paradigms of corporeal motions. It remains, therefore, to demonstrate that the motions of the soul are the final causes of other motions.[‡] For immortality is not predicated of the soul, as a certain other thing, but is co-essentialised in the very essence of it, and unically comprehends the whole demonstration. For immortality is a certain life in the same manner as

[‡] Because it is that *from which* or *in which*, other things are effected.

[§] This is on the supposition that all things stand still.

[†] For this is, as it were, a new birth of the soul.

[‡] The demonstration of this is wanting in the original. For in the original after *λειπεται δε και τελικας αυτας αποδειξαι*, there immediately follows *επειδη και ο σπουδαιος ενταυθα και εμφρων ανηρ προ; το εαυτου χρησιμεν και διοτι*, which evidently implies that something preceding is wanting. And it is obvious from the translation of what follows, that there is no demonstration of the motions of the soul being the final causes of other motions. It may, however, be summarily shown as follows, that the motions of the soul are the final causes of other motions. The motions of the soul are, as has been demonstrated, the effective causes of other motions. Every thing desires good. Good is proximately imparted.

self-motion. Plato, therefore, afterwards adduces an evolved and expanded demonstration, when he says, "*for that which is always moved is immortal,*" etc. omitting to say that the soul is self-moved, as being common to the two syllogisms, and intending to introduce it as the last of the four arguments, where also we may more accurately investigate it. Now, however, prior to the discussion of the parts of the first arguments, let us logically adapt the words themselves of Plato to the propositions.

All the propositions, therefore, of the syllogisms are three. The soul is self-moved: the self-moved is always moved: that which is always moved is immortal. But as we have said, the first and smallest of all the propositions, which says the soul is self-moved, is ranked as the last. For the third and greatest of all of them is placed first, as being connective of the whole reasoning; and this is that in which Plato says "*for that which is always moved is immortal.*" But the proposition posterior to this, which says, that which is self-moved is always moved, is introduced through the contrary, the alter-motive, together with demonstration. For Plato here says: "*But that which moves another thing, and is moved by another,*" *ie.* the alter-motive nature, "*in consequence of having a cessation of motion*" *ie.* not being always moved, "*has also a cessation of life.*" *ie.* is not immortal. If, therefore, that which is moved by another, in consequence of not being always moved, is not immortal, that which is self-moved, being always moved, is immortal. All the propositions, however, are assumed essentially, and so far as each of them is that which it is. For from that which is moved by another, it is not only demonstrated that the self-moved is always moved, but also that the always-moved is self-moved; so that they convert, as for instance, the self-moved is always moved, and the always-moved is self-moved. For if that which is moved by another has a cessation of motion, *ie.* if the alter-motive is not always-moved, it will be evident that the always-moved is self-moved. For this is collected by the second hypothetic syllogism. For if the alter-motive is not always-moved, it is evident that the always-moved is not alter-motive. But that which is not alter-motive is self-motive. And from the words, "*because it does not desert itself,*" it is collected, that every thing which is always-moved is self-moved. For if the alter-motive is likewise always-moved, it is in consequence of subsisting in conjunction with the motive cause. Much more, therefore, will that which is self-moved be always-moved, because it is not only always present with itself, but is united to itself.

Resuming, however, the consideration of the propositions, let us endeavour to render them as perspicuous as possible. "*The soul is self-moved.*" By motion here, we must understand the life of the soul. The soul therefore is self-vital, containing in itself the principle and fountain of life. For if nature had intended that bodies should be self-moved, she would have inserted in them the principle and fountain of motion. But now, since it is necessary that they should rank as alter-motive natures, she generated bodies receiving the principle of motion from other things. The soul likewise, is seen deliberately choosing many things, and performing many, according to its own proper deliberate choice. But this would not be the case if it were not self-moved. At the same time also, if you look to the nature of the thing, you will find, on account of its clearness, a great abundance of arguments in proof of this. Plato, however, exciting our recollection from clear evidence, and from the last of things, says, "*that when we see a body incapable of being moved by itself, we immediately say that it is inanimate; but when we perceive a body which can move itself, we immediately say that it is animated,*" in consequence of spontaneously inferring that self-motion is the form and definition of the soul. But from that which is in our power, you may especially demonstrate the self-motive nature of the soul. For if well-being is more excellent and perfect than being, but the soul perfects itself, it is manifest, that as it imparts to itself that which is more excellent, *viz.* well-being, and excites and perfects itself, it will much more impart to itself that which is less excellent, *viz.* being or existence. The being of the soul, however, is nothing else than life. But life is motion. It is evident therefore, that the soul will impart to itself motion. Hence it is self-moved. But that which imparts life to other things will much more impart life to itself. For that which vivifies other things will in a much greater degree impart vivification to itself; so that the soul by imparting life to itself, will vivify and elevate itself. But life is motion. The soul therefore, will impart motion to itself. And hence it is self-moved. For divine natures, and those that first impart any thing, begin their energies from themselves; just as the sun that illuminates all things, is light itself, and the fountain of light. Soul therefore, which imparts life and self-motion to other things - for animals, according to Aristotle, are self-moved - is much more self-moved, and life, and the fountain of psychical life.

But that which is self-moved, is demonstrated to be always moved, by showing that the self-moved is alone always-moved, and is alone immortal, from assuming the former propositions by themselves, and so far as they are essentially what they are. Plato therefore demonstrates from the alter-motive, that the self-moved is always-moved. For it is evident that the alter-motive has not its motion from itself; and on this account it is called alter-

motive. Hence, receiving this[†] temporally from something else, it also loses it in time. But that which imparts motion to itself essentially, as being always present with itself, and the giver and receiver being one and the same, will be always moved. Plato, however, manifests that he assumes motion in life. "*For having,*" says he, "*a cessation of motion, it has also a cessation of life.*"

But that the alter-motive has a cessation of motion, *ie.* is not always moved, is evident from hence. For as there are these two things, the mover and that which is moved, it is necessary, either that the mover should accede to that which is moved, and thus should move it, just as we do when we move a stone; or that the thing moved should accede to the mover, and thus should be moved, just as the soul betaking itself to intellect, is moved by it, and surveys the forms which it contains; or it is necessary that both should accede to each other; in the same manner as the master and the disciple; for the disciple gives himself to be excited by the master, and the master hastens to excite the disciple, and in short is converted to him. These things therefore, thus subsisting, that which is alter-motive is not able of itself to accede to the mover; for its very existence consists in being moved by something else. Hence in order that what is moved by another may be always moved, it is necessary that the motive cause should be converted to it. In wholes, however, and eternal natures, it is not lawful for things which are more excellent to be converted to natures subordinate to themselves. For more excellent natures would subsist for the sake of others, and subordinate natures would be things for the sake of which others subsist, which is most absurd. That which is alter-motive therefore will not be always moved in this way; *ie.* through the conversion of eternal natures to it. But if it is to be moved at a certain time, it is necessary that it should be led by something else to the motive cause, not merely locally, but also according to aptitude. If therefore, another thing conjoins it to the motive cause, from a certain time, it will again in a certain time be separated from this cause. For universally, all things which are generated by causes that are mutable, are generated and corrupted in time; but things which are generated by immutable causes, are generated perpetually in a manner invariably the same.

Some one, however, may say, how is the sublunary region always moved, since it is alter-motive? May it not be said, that it is never always the same, nor remains the same according to number, except in form; so that if it is not the same according to its subject, how will it be always-moved? For being corrupted according to its parts it always remains in the same form. But if neither generation is able to accede of itself to the heavens, nor the heavens are converted to generation, in consequence of it not being proper that more excellent should be converted to less excellent natures, whence does generation receive its aptitude? May it not be replied, that the motion of the heavens being efficacious, acts on sublunary natures, celestial natures not being converted to them, just as the sun illuminates, not by being converted to the illuminated substances, but by sympathy? But how is the heaven not alter-motive, but self-moved, since it is a body? And if it is alter-motive, how will it be always-moved? May it not be said, that the heaven is neither alter-motive, nor simply body, but an immaterial body? We also say, that the self-moved is twofold, the one being simple and impartible, which is properly self-moved, but the other having now proceeded into interval, is not simply impartible. For so far as it is distended with bulk, so far it is changed from that which is properly self-moved; but so far as it participates of a connascent life in its essence, so that it is not possible, even in definition, to separate that body from the life of it, so far it has also self-motion in its proper essence. For self-motion is the peculiarity of soul and life. As therefore, it is impossible for a material body to be uncoloured and unfigured, thus also it is still more impossible for a celestial body to be lifeless and inanimate. And thus you may see the coalition of it with soul. The summits, likewise, of secondary natures, are always conjoined to the extremities of first natures, in order that there may be a certain continuity, and that no vacuum may intervene; since again, another nature would be requisite, which may fill up that which is between. Since, therefore, an ethereal body is the first of bodies, but soul is the last of intelligibles, these ought to be conjoined to each other, and possess a mutual similitude; so that a celestial body is soul amplified into bulk, and life extended into triple dimension. Hence the life which is in it is connascent, and nature in it is mingled with life. There are also in it many other forms of animals.

But it may be said, let the soul, so far as it is soul, be self-moved, and always-moved, yet nothing hinders it from being corrupted. To this we reply, that either the energy of it, *ie.* its self-motion, must first cease, but the existence of it be afterwards corrupted; or the existence of it first, but the self-motion of it afterwards; or both these must cease at once. For besides these, there are no other cases. If the essence therefore, of it is corrupted, it is not possible to devise how the energy of it can be saved. But neither vice versa, is it possible in the hypothesis before

[†] For ταυτα here, it is necessary to read ταυτην.

us, that the energy being corrupted, the essence of the soul can be saved; for to assert this, would be to forget the hypothesis which says, that the soul, as far as it is soul, will be self-moved. So that it is not possible for self-motion to be corrupted, but the soul to remain. For as the hypothesis says, as far as it is soul, it will be self-moved. If therefore, every thing which is corrupted, first loses its energy, but the soul, according to the hypothesis, so far as it is soul, does not lose its energy, being self-moved, it is also incorruptible.

Let, however, the third case be supposed, that the soul may be corrupted at one and the same time with its energies. We ask, therefore, whether it will be corrupted by itself, or by some external cause? But it will not, indeed, be corrupted by itself, because it preserves itself by moving itself. And it will not be corrupted by external causes, because it would thus be alter-motive, instead of self-motive. Hence it will not be corrupted together with its energies. Besides, by what external cause could it be corrupted? Shall we say, by natures more excellent than itself? But these are rather the saviours, than the destroyers of it. Can it, therefore, be corrupted by natures inferior to it? Over these, however, it possesses a despotic power, and is the fountain of their motions. For as there are ten motions, the motion of the soul alone is generative of all the others. But the soul being self-moved, you may also more concisely infer that it is always-moved, as follows, as we have already observed respecting self-motion. That which perfects itself, likewise produces itself. For that which perfects imparts good to itself. But that which simply produces any thing, imparts existence to it. Well-being, however, is more excellent than being. Since, therefore, the soul perfects itself, it will also produce itself. But the essence of it is life, which it also imparts to other things. Hence it will impart life and existence to itself. That, however, which is always present with that which imparts existence, always is. But the soul is always present with itself. Hence the soul always is, so that it is always self-moved, and always-moved. For in reality, an injury would be done to any thing in the universe which should be deprived of that which it imparted to itself. For it would not be injured in being deprived of that which it received from another; but it is injured, if that is taken away from it which it imparts to itself.

The last proposition, however, is not attended with any ambiguity, *viz.* that what is always-moved is immortal. For if, according to hypothesis, it were mortal and corruptible, it would no longer be always moved. So that all the propositions are not only true, but they are so essentially so as to be equal in power and convertible. What then, some one may say, is soul alone immortal, but is intellect not immortal? Or is there no absurdity in saying that intellect is not immortal? For it is above the immortal. But if you are willing to say that it is immortal, you must assume another form of self-motion, and another form of immortality; and in a similar manner in the successive lives, an immortality must be assumed adapted to each. For there is a great extent of things which exist in eternity; of those which exist in the whole of time; and of those whose duration is only in a part of time. For some beings live for one day, others for a year, other for ten years, and others for a hundred, or a thousand years. But how is it possible that the partial nature[†] likewise should not be immortal, since it is self-moved. In answer to this, in the first place, it must be observed, that the divine Iamblichus, and the philosopher Porphyry, do not admit that the partial nature is self-moved, but assert, that being the instrument of the soul, it is moved indeed by it, but moves the things which are saved by it. And this they say, is the ninth motion. It is evident, however, that though this partial nature should have a certain self-mobility, yet it has this after the manner of an image, and as an instrument.

But if it be requisite to say something in opposition to certain philosophers, nature is not in all respects superior to bodies, but there is something in it which is inferior to them. For so far as it is a certain incorporeal essence, and so far as it fashions and adorns bodies, it is superior to them; but so far as it is in them as subjects, and has its existence in them, it is inferior to them. Just as the resemblance in a mirror, in security, beauty, and accuracy of form, surpasses the mirror; but in hypostasis is inferior to it. For the mirror, indeed, is more essential, but the representation has its subsistence as an image from the mirror, is whatever it is for the sake of it, and on this account will have a more obscure being. After this manner therefore, the partial nature subsists with reference to the body. For the nature which is divine has self-motion secondarily, as we have before observed, and connascent with a divine body. From this syllogism, therefore, it is demonstrated, that the soul is not corrupted by itself. In the soul, likewise, one part of it does not alone move, and another part is alone moved, but whatever part of it may be assumed, moves and is moved according to the same.

Some one, however, may still desire to learn more clearly what the motion is which subsists in the soul. It is evident, therefore, that it is not any one of the corporeal motions, not even the ninth [which pertains to the partial

[†] *ie.* The life distributed about the body, the peculiarities of which are, generation, nutrition, and increase.

nature]. For these are not self-motive. But neither do all the peculiar motions of the soul manifest the motion which is now investigated, such as will, opinion, anger, and desire: for the soul is not always moved according to these; but we now inquire what that motion is, which is always inherent in it. *This motion, therefore, is the life which is connascent with the soul, which it imparts to itself, and according to which it is moved.* And these motions indeed, I mean will, opinion, and the like, are the lives and the motions of the soul, yet they are not always inherent in it, but only sometimes, becoming, as it were, renewed.[†] But from the soul perfecting itself, you may especially assume that it is self-moved, and by this you may separate the rational soul from the irrational, and from nature. For it belongs to the rational soul to perfect and excite itself, and to be converted to itself, no one of which pertains to the others. Hence, this exposition is adapted to the divine and human soul, *ie.* to every rational soul, and not to the irrational soul and nature. *"To such other things also as are moved, this is the fountain and principle of motion. But principle is unbegotten, etc."*

The second syllogism, which shows that the soul is immortal, is as follows: The soul is self-moved. That which is self-moved is the principle of motion. The principle of motion is unbegotten. The unbegotten is incorruptible. The incorruptible is immortal. The soul, therefore, is immortal. The propositions here are five. The first of the syllogisms, therefore, shows that the soul is sufficient to itself. But this second syllogism demonstrates its extension to other things, just as all divine natures are sufficient to themselves, and the sources of good to others. For the extended here signifies, that which imparts to others what it possesses itself. For it is characteristic of a beneficent and unenvying nature, and of super-plenitude of power. The intention, therefore, of the reasoning, is to manifest in the soul the extension of it to other things. And the proposition, indeed, which says, *"that which is self-moved is the principle of motion,"* is sufficiently demonstrated by Plato in the *Laws*, when he says, that if all things should stand still, self-motive natures would be the first things that would be moved. The order of things, likewise, is as follows. That which is immovable is the first. That which is self-moved is the second. And that which is alter-motive is the third. But *the principle, says Plato, is unbegotten; ie.* the principle of motion. For this was the thing proposed. Making, however, the proposition to be more universal, he extends it to every principle; because every principle, so far as it is a principle, is unbegotten.

But here, many of the more ancient interpreters are disturbed about the meaning of Plato, when he says, *"that the principle is unbegotten."* For if he asserts this of the principle of all things, *viz.* of the first God, the assertion is true; but it is not now proposed to speak of this principle. And if he simply speaks of every principle how is this assertion true? For Peleus is the principle of Achilles, yet Peleus is not unbegotten. We must consider, therefore, what the principle is, of which he is speaking. We say, therefore, that principle, properly so called, is that which primarily produces the whole form. Thus, for instance, the equal itself is that which produces all-various equals; and man itself, is that which everywhere produces men. Thus, therefore, since the soul is the principle of motion, it will be able to produce all the forms or species of motion, so that so far as motion, it will not be generated. Hence, if as essence, or as intellectual, it is generated from being and intellect, yet, so far as it is motion, it is not generated. For this is the principle of the motion of all things. For material forms also, are unbegotten; such, for instance, as the form of man, the form of horse, of the equal, and of motion, and consequently much more must the cause of form be unbegotten. Hence, since the form of motion is unbegotten, much more will the cause itself of motion, but this is that which is self-moved. Plato likewise, properly calls it the *fountain* of motion. For it is the peculiarity of a fountain to impart, as it were, what belongs to itself spontaneously, to things which are different from itself. But it is the peculiarity of a principle to preside, as it were, and despotically rule over things which subsist through it. *For a cause is a principle, as being co-ordinated with the things of which it is the principle; but it is a fountain, as exempt, and subsisting in intellect, both of which are inherent in the soul.* Plato, therefore, would have been liberated from any further discussion, by concisely saying the principle of motion is unbegotten: for generation is motion, but the principle of motion will not be moved by any thing else, lest we should proceed to infinity. But he thought fit to give a more ample extent to the theory.

The unbegotten nature, therefore, of principle, must be understood as follows: the principle is not any one of the things of which it is the principle. Thus, for instance, the sun is the principle of light; it is not, therefore, illuminated by any thing else. Intellect also, being the principle of intellect, and being itself intellectual, does not derive from any thing else intellectual perception. And being, which is the cause of existence to other things, does not possess its subsistence as being from any other source. Hence the soul, which is the cause of other things being

[†] Instead of οἰον ἐξ ἀναδιπλωσεως in this place, I read οἰον ἐξ ἀνανεωσεως.

animated, and possessing life, has not itself a life extrinsically derived; so that if it is the first motion, it will be the cause of other things being moved, and will not be moved by any thing else. Hence, every principle is unbegotten. What then, if some one should say, do not all things derive their existence from the first cause? To this it may be replied, in the first place, that in assuming the principle of a certain thing, we ought not to consider any one of the principles above it. And in the next place, it may be said, that principle is after another manner, a thing of such a kind as its productions. For the equal itself generates other secondary equals; and the motion of the soul generates other forms or species of motion. *But the first cause is not after another manner such as the things which proceed from it: for it is above principle, and above cause.* Intellect, therefore, is primarily from itself *intellectual*; but it is *being* from something else [*ie.* from being itself]. But that which is just primarily derives its subsistence from justice itself. And justice itself does not become just through any thing else. For so far as it is justice, and so far as it directs other things, it originates from itself. Nothing, however, prevents it so far as it is something else, such, for instance, as being or intellect, or a certain God, from deriving its subsistence from the principle of all things. But Plato summarily demonstrates as follows: that, if principle were generated, it would be generated from that which is not principle, through the hypothesis that it is principle. Nothing generated is the first. But every thing generated is generated from something else. No principle, therefore, is generated; for if every thing which is generated is generated from a certain principle, principle also, if it were generated, would be generated from a certain principle; so that principle would be in want of principle to its generation, and this would be the case to infinity. Again, every thing generated is generated from that which is not such as itself is. Thus an animal is generated from that which is not an animal, [*ie.* from seed,] and a house from that which is not a house; so that principle also, if it were generated, would be generated from that which is not principle. Hence, at one and the same time, as being generated, it would be generated from a principle, and as a principle it would be generated from that which is not a principle, which is impossible. Every thing, therefore, which is primarily a certain thing, *ie.* every principle, is unbegotten. These things, therefore, are sufficient to the demonstration of the incorruptibility of principles.

But Plato also adds another demonstration, through a deduction to an impossibility. "*For the principle,*" says he, "*being destroyed, it could neither itself be generated from another thing, nor another thing be generated from it.*" For because every thing generated is generated from a principle, nothing else could be generated from it; for the principle (from the hypothesis) is destroyed. But neither could it be generated again, because that which is generated must again be generated from a certain principle. The principle, however, is destroyed. For as when a root is cut off, no germination can take place; thus also, Plato says, "*that the principle of generation being destroyed, all heaven and generation falling together must stop, and would never again have any thing from whence they would be generated.*"

The next proposition, which says that the unbegotten is incorruptible, Aristotle also strenuously demonstrates; which may concisely be demonstrated as follows: If that which is unbegotten were corrupted, either all things would come to an end, being corrupted, or they would again be restored [*ie.* be again generated]; and from corruptible natures we should arrive at the unbegotten. And thus that which is generated will be unbegotten. For if that which is unbegotten were corruptible, but the corruptible is generated, the unbegotten is generated, which is impossible. Plato, however, in his demonstration, comprehends both these in one. For if the principle were generated or corrupted, it is necessary that all things should fall together with it, and thus neither heaven nor generation would exist, nor even that which is unbegotten.

Thus far, therefore, Plato collects through two syllogisms, that the self-moved is immortal, without making any mention of the soul, except when he pre-announces the conclusion at the beginning; so that he has demonstrated concerning that which is self-moved, that it is immortal. Now, however, he assumes the first and smallest proposition, that the soul is self-moved, when he says, "*Since then it appears that the nature which is moved by itself is immortal, he who asserts that this is the essence and definition of the soul, will have no occasion to blush, etc.*" But he syllogises as follows: Every [rational] soul, is alone the principle of motion to bodies. That which imparts the principle of motion to bodies, is self-moved. The soul therefore is self-moved. He reminds us, however, of this from the last of things, and from what is apparent. For if the animated differs from the inanimated body, in being moved by itself and inwardly, (for that which we see moved by itself, we denominate animated) it is evident that the soul, since it moves itself, and desires to move the animal, will thus much more cause it to be moved. But we must not be disturbed, lest we should be forced to admit, that those souls of animals are immortal, which we are accustomed to call animations alone and *entelecheias* [or forms], such as the souls of worms and gnats. For either

the soul itself is inserted in bodies as the principle of motion, being itself present with them, as in us, or it imparts a certain resemblance of itself.

How, therefore, it may be said, do we see the inanimate body moved by itself to corruption? Does not fire also tend upward of itself, and a clod of earth downward? For either the body which proceeds to corruption, is in reality perfectly inanimate, and the soul is not the cause of all motion; or it is animated, and the soul will be the cause of this, which imparts life and existence to other things. To this we reply, that what is called an inanimate body, is so called with reference to a partial soul, because it has not a peculiar soul, but is animated by the soul of the universe. For every body considered as existing in the animated world, is in a certain respect animated;[†] just as the excrements which are in us participate, so far as they are in us, of a certain vital heat, but when they proceed out of the body, are deprived of this animating warmth. *Body, therefore, so far as it is in the world, has a vestige of soul,[‡] which moves it, and causes it to be that which it is.* Through this also, fire tends upward, and a clod of earth downward, as being moved by the soul of the universe. For nature, by which they are moved, is a resemblance of soul. But we denominate them inanimate, in consequence of comparing them with a partial soul. It is not proper, however, to wonder, if the soul becomes the cause of corruption; for we have before observed, that it produces motions, as looking to its own advantage, and the good of the universe. In the human species also, we see that the worthy man destroys his body by famine, when by so doing it is beneficial to him. Thus, therefore, the soul of the universe, when a partial soul leaves the body, analyses the body, and restores it to the elements whence it was derived. For its further existence in a composite state, is no longer advantageous to the universe; just as the nature which is in us, compounds some of the juices, but dissolves others, extending itself to what is useful to the whole of our body.

Of the two before-mentioned syllogisms, therefore, each indeed demonstrates, both that the soul is neither corrupted from itself, nor by any thing external to it; nevertheless, the first in a greater degree demonstrates the former, and the second the latter. Hence Plato assumes the proposition which is common to both the syllogisms, and which says that the soul is self-moved. And he does this, not simply for the sake of dialectic argument; but since self-motion[†] itself is the essence of the soul, this is the cause of the soul not being corrupted, and of other things living and being connected by it. Both the arguments, therefore, are demonstrative. For they are assumed from the definition of the soul, and all the definitions are essential, so far as the soul is what it is. Hence also they reciprocate with each other, or are convertible. And here, it is especially requisite to admire the philosopher, for employing in his reasoning that which is most peculiar to, and characteristic of the soul, omitting such particulars as are common to it with other[‡] things. *For the soul is an incorporeal, self-moved essence, gnostic of beings.* You see, therefore, that according to all the rest, it communicates with many things, but is especially characterised by self-motion. That also which appears principally to pertain to it, *viz.* to be gnostic of beings, this no less pertains likewise to sense. For sense is gnostic of things co-ordinate to its nature."

246a What are we to understand by the charioteer and the two horses? In the first place, this is to be considered respecting them, whether it is necessary to arrange them according to essences, or according to powers, or according to energies. For there are different opinions on this subject. I say then, that they must be arranged according to powers. For their arrangement cannot be according to energies, since the horses are represented energizing, but there are not energies of energies; and because the energies of the soul are at different times different, but the horses are always the same. For the soul does not receive different horses at different times, but always has the same. Nor can the arrangement be according to essences, since even in our souls, the essences remain undefiled with vice. For the essence of soul is never vitiated; since if it were, it would perish. But the powers of it become depraved, and this is in a much greater degree the case with its energies. Plato himself likewise says, "*that the horses and charioteers of the Gods are all of them good, and consist of such things as are good;*" but of ours he says, "*that they become depraved, and suffer a defluxion of the wings.*" If therefore, the essence of our soul remains undefiled with vice, but the powers of it become distorted, the horses and charioteers may be very

[†] For $\alpha\psi\upsilon\chi\omicron\nu$ here, it is necessary to read $\epsilon\mu\psi\upsilon\chi\omicron\nu$.

[‡] This vestige of soul in body, is the cause of the gravitation of bodies.

[†] For $\alpha\kappa\iota\nu\eta\sigma\iota\alpha$ here, it is necessary to read $\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\kappa\iota\nu\eta\sigma\iota\alpha$.

[‡] Instead of $\alpha\lambda\lambda\eta\lambda\alpha$ in this place, it is requisite to read $\alpha\lambda\lambda\alpha$.

properly arranged according to powers. But this also Plato himself clearly proclaims, when he says, "*Let it be similar to the connascent power of a winged chariot and charioteer.*" If however, some one should say, that the words, "*all of them are good and consist of things good,*" are spoken as signifying that these horses and charioteers are derived from beneficent causes, the words that follow will bear witness against this interpretation. For our horses and charioteers are from things that are good, as from causes; so that all of them according to this will be good. Plato, however, says that ours are defiled with vice. But Plato is not the first who assumes a charioteer and horses: for prior to him they were assumed by the divinely inspired poets Homer, Orpheus, and Parmenides. By them however, as being inspired, they are mentioned without a cause: for they spoke enthusiastically. But since Plato introduces nothing into his philosophy, which he could not derive from a cause, let us show why, though he speaks with greater dignity about these particulars, he omits to mention the causes of them; in the mean time observing, that the theologians prior to him, appear to have assumed the charioteer and horses, as pertaining to powers. For Jupiter in Homer,[‡] uses horses, which Neptune is said to unbrace, and he does not always use them, but is represented as sometimes sitting on a throne. But if the essence of Jupiter consisted in riding in a chariot, and Jupiter was the same as the charioteer, he would always drive a chariot. Now however, he is represented as doing other things. By the horses and charioteer therefore, the different powers of Jupiter are celebrated. In the mean time, it must be observed, that the assertions respecting a divine and human soul ought to be common.

Plato therefore, in the *Timæus* says, that the Demiurgus in constituting the essence of the soul, assumed a middle essence from the genera of being, *viz.* from [the three genera] *essence, same and different.* And this middle nature which he assumed, is a medium between an impartible essence and the essence which is divisible about bodies. But the irrational life, nature, and the participations of soul by the body, constitute the essence which is divisible about bodies. And again, the Demiurgus assumed a middle sameness, which is a medium between impartible sameness, and the sameness which is divisible about bodies. The like also takes place with respect to the middle difference. The Demiurgus likewise, says Plato, mingling these three, constituted the essence of the soul. These middles however, in divine souls, consist of pure and incorruptible genera, but this is not the case in our souls. But as Plato says, "the Demiurgus poured mingling, the remainder of the former mixture; in a certain respect indeed, after the same manner, yet not similarly incorruptible according to the same, but deficient from the first, in a second and third degree." *The horses therefore, and the charioteer, are the powers of these three; and the one power of the soul, which is productive of these three powers, is the idea of the soul.* The power therefore of being, i.e. of essence, which is one of the genera, is the charioteer; but the power of *the same*, is the better of the two horses; and the power of *the different*, is the less excellent horse. Hence, if we conceive two horses and a charioteer, which are made to coalesce, then the one power which is generative and productive of the charioteer and the horses, is the idea of the soul. *Power* however, must here be understood conformably to geometricians, in the way they are accustomed to say, that a right line is in power a square. In what was before said therefore, Plato discussed the essence of the soul; but here, he speaks about its powers; and in what follows, about its energies. These therefore, being three, *viz.* essence, self-motion, and immortality, three powers are here assumed, analogous to them, *viz.* the idea of the soul, the horses, and the more partial lives of the horses. For the idea of the soul is assumed analogous to the one essence of it, which unically possesses both self-motion and immortality. But the horses, and the self-motive nature of them, are assumed analogous to the self-motion of the soul. And the more partial lives of the horses, *viz.* the ascents and descents of the soul, the defluxion of her wings, and the germination of them, are analogous to her immortality.

But why does he call the power of *the same*, and the power of *the different*, the horses, but the power of essence, which is one of the genera of being, the charioteer? It is evident therefore that all the genera participate of each other, but each is denominated according to that which predominates. And essence, which is now assumed in order to the composition of the soul, is the summit and is most perfect, and according to this has dominion over the rest. Hence the soul is not compelled to be moved according to essence.[†] But the remaining two which are the powers of *the same* and *the different*, are assimilated to horses, as being seen in motion and periodic progressions. These powers also are the circles or wheels of *the same* and *the different*. For considered as proceeding about the intelligible, they are horses, but as returning to the same condition, they are circles or wheels. And the better wheel indeed, which is the circle of *the same*, is that which revolves about intelligibles, and has the power of

[‡] *Iliad*, viii, 440.

[†] For the soul is eternal according to essence, but temporal according to energy. Hence according to the former it is immovable, but is movable according to the latter.

elevating the soul; on which account also, it is called voluble or agile. But the less excellent wheel, which is the circle of *the different*, and is genesiurgic, revolves about sensible and doxastic natures, and is called erect, when it possesses its proper virtue, and thus has an indication of the erect, and the unoblique, when it announces sensibles without distortion. Thus for instance, if opinion wishes to perceive something sensible, pre-election, or deliberate choice is sufficient, and this excites and extends the spirit. This also, if it should happen to be requisite sends forth rays through the eyes. But these dart forth to the sensible object, and sense being again bent back through the eyes, announces what it sees to the spirit, and from thence to opinion; and thus the reflexion or bending back, is not accurately a circle, but by running in a right line, from the goal to the barrier, and from the barrier to the goal, it imitates a circle. The whole of this likewise, is an erect circle. But when it announces any thing in a distorted manner, it is said to sustain all-various fractures. This circle also, [in partial souls,] has a downward-drawing, and genesiurgic power. But in divine souls, it providentially attends to secondary natures.

We may likewise make the following division, and call the intellect of the soul, the charioteer; but the circle of *the same*, and the better horse, the dianoetic part of the soul; and the circle of *the different*, and the less excellent horse, the doxastic part. But it must be observed, that dianoia participates of difference, and opinion of sameness. For every part which you may assume of the soul participates of both these. And if we survey indeed the horses and the charioteer, according to that which is highest in the soul, the supreme union of the soul with intelligibles and the Gods, will be the charioteer. But the better horse will be that power of the soul, which always aspires after intelligibles. And the inferior horse, will be that power, which comes into contact with intellections, accompanied with division and transition. And these things indeed will take place, if you survey the charioteer and the horses, in the dianoetic soul alone. But if you survey them in the doxastic soul, then dianoia must be assumed as the charioteer; the power of the doxastic part, which always desires to be co-arranged with dianoia, must be considered as the better of the two horses; and that power of it which aspires after generation, and the government of secondary natures, as the less excellent horse. It is possible also, by assuming the charioteer according to both dianoia and opinion conjoined, to arrange the better horse, as corresponding to the dianoetic power alone, but the inferior horse, as analogous to the doxastic power. For it must be observed, that when the soul gives itself up to more excellent natures, then opinion resigns the whole of itself to dianoia, and wishes to pertain to it alone; though when it becomes weary, it wishes to energize by itself. And these things indeed, *viz.* the horses and the charioteer, we may survey in the rational soul alone.

Since however the soul descends so as to have the irrational nature woven together with it, and each of the horses resists, in being thus connected with the irrational form of the soul, we must not omit to consider these also when in this condition. For the soul possessed the former, according to the eternal progression of itself from the Demiurgus alone. But those of which I am now going to speak, the soul receives from the junior Gods, and from the connexion with the mortal form of life. The charioteer therefore, will here subsist according to opinion; but the better of the two horses will be anger; and the inferior horse will be desire. Hence when opinion is in an erect condition, it produces the middle,[†] and rightly opining man, and a middle charioteer. But when opinion is distorted, it produces the distorted man, and resembles a charioteer hurried along at the will of the horses. The doxastic horses, and charioteer therefore, when properly disciplined, produce for us the highest political man; but the dianoetic horses and charioteer, the contemplative, or theoretic man. These horses however, and the charioteer, are changed, according to the spheres and the elements, and according to every form of life. For in the solar sphere, they are solar, in the sphere of Jupiter, they are Jovian, in the sphere of Mars, Martial; and in short, they are always established according to the peculiarity of the God [about which they are arranged]. And if indeed, they are established according to the divine form, they are divine; if according to the angelic, they are angelical; if according to the dæmoniackal form of life, they are dæmoniackal: but if according to the heroic form, they are heroic; and in a similar manner in all the other forms of life.

But what are we to understand by the word *υποπτερον*?[‡] And in the first place, let us see what a wing signifies. The wing of the soul therefore, is her anagogic power, which is especially seen according to the better of the two horses. We denominate this horse therefore, a wheel, or rather the circle of *the same*, because it is a lover of the beautiful, aspires after intelligibles, and never resists the charioteer, but acts rightly, and also errs in conjunction with it. But the other horse, which is the downward-drawing and genesiurgic power of the soul, gravitates to

[†] *i.e.* Man of a middle class of excellence.

[‡] This word means literally *sub-winged*.

earth, and resists the charioteer. All souls therefore have wings: for all of them have all powers, and this is also the case with the charioteer and the horses. But in divine souls indeed, the wings are always unincumbered; and hence they are said to be *winged*, (πτερωτοι) but not *sub-winged* (υποπτεροι). On the contrary, in our souls which are human, the wings are not always expanded, but are sometimes closed and sluggish. For we possess the power of them (since we never lose our powers); but we have not always the energy of them. Hence to us the term *sub-winged* is more adapted, in consequence of possessing the power, but not entirely the energy of wings. But to the Gods, the term *winged* is adapted, as having in efficacy, both powers and energies. Hence afterwards, he says of our soul, *that formerly it was winged*. Wishing therefore to assert that which is common both to divine souls and ours, he uses the word *sub-winged*. For all souls have an anagogic power, though some have it always, but others sometimes only in energy. Or it may be said that the term *sub-winged* is properly asserted, both of divine souls, and ours. Of divine souls indeed, because in them, the wings are about their lowest powers, and which are nearest to the earth: their energies being always established in intelligibles. But the whole of the term *sub-winged*, is adapted to our souls, because *the winged* is not properly true, when applied to them, except at certain times.

249d or 265b "Since Plato here delivers four kinds of mania, by which I mean enthusiasm, and possession or inspiration from the Gods, *viz.* the musical, the telestic, the prophetic, and the amatory, previous to the discussion of each, we must first speak about enthusiasm, and show to what part of the soul the enthusiastic energy pertains; whether each part of it possesses this energy; if all enthusiasm is from the Gods; and in what part of the soul it is ingenerated: or whether it subsists in something else more excellent than soul. Where then, does that which is properly and primarily called enthusiasm subsist, and what is it? Of the rational soul, there are two parts, one of which is *dianoia*, but the other *opinion*. Again however, of *dianoia*, one part is said to be the lowest, and is properly *dianoia*, but another part of it is the highest, which is said to be the intellect of it, according to which the soul especially becomes intellectual, and which some call intellect in capacity. There is also another thing above this, which is the summit of the whole soul, and most allied to *the one*, which likewise wishes well to all things, and always gives itself up to the Gods, and is readily disposed to so whatever they please. This too, is said to be *the one* of the soul, bears the image of the super-essential one, and unites the whole soul. But that these things necessarily thus subsist, we may learn as follows. The rational soul derives its existence from all the causes prior to itself, *i.e.* from intellect and the Gods. But it subsists also from itself: for it perfects itself. So far therefore, as it subsists from the Gods, it possesses *the one*, which unites all its powers, and all the multitude of itself, and conjoins them to *the one itself*, and is the first recipient of the goods imparted by the Gods. It likewise makes all the essence of the soul to be boniform, according to which it is connected with the Gods, and united to them. But so far as it subsists from intellect, it possesses an intellectual nature, according to which it apprehends forms, by simple projections, or intuitions, and not discursively; and is conjoined to the intellect which is above itself. And so far as it constitutes itself, it possesses the dianoetic power, according to which it generates sciences, and certain theorems, energizes discursively, and collects conclusions from propositions. For that it constitutes or gives subsistence to itself, is evident from its imparting perfection to itself; since that which leads itself to perfection, and imparts to itself well-being, will much more impart to itself existence. For well-being is a greater thing than being. If therefore, the soul imparts that which is greater to itself, it will much more impart that which is less. Hence that which is primarily, properly, and truly enthusiasm from the Gods, is effected according to this one of the soul, which is above *dianoia*, and above the intellect of the soul: which one is at another time in a relaxed and dormant state. This one likewise, becoming illuminated [by the Gods,] all the life of the soul is illuminated, and also intellect, *dianoia*, and the irrational part, and the resemblance of enthusiasm is transmitted, as far as to the body itself.

"Other enthusiasms therefore, are produced about other parts of the soul, certain *dæmons* exciting them, or the Gods also, though not without the intervention of *dæmons*. For *dianoia* us said to energize enthusiastically, when it discovers sciences and theorems in a very short space of time, and in a greater degree than other men. Opinion likewise and the phantasy are said thus to energize, when they discover arts, and accomplish admirable works, such for instance as Phidias effected in the formation of statues, and another in another art, as also Homer says[§] of him who made the belt of Hercules, 'that he neither did, nor would artificially produce such another.' Anger likewise, is said to energize enthusiastically, when in battle it energizes supernaturally.

§ Odyss. XI, 612.

Like Mars, when brandishing his spear, he rag'd.

Iliad XV, 605.

But if some one yielding to desire, should eat of that which reason forbids, and through this should unexpectedly become well, you may say that desire also in this instance, energized enthusiastically, though obscurely; so that enthusiasm is likewise produced about the other parts of the soul. Enthusiasm however, properly so called, is when this one of the soul which is above intellect, is excited to the Gods, and is from thence inspired. But at different times, it is possessed about the aptitudes of itself, by different Gods; and is more or less possessed, when intellect or *dianoia* is that which is moved. As therefore, when we inquire what philosophy is, we do not always accurately define it, but frequently, from an improper use of the word, call mathematics, or physics, philosophy, and science; we do the like also with respect to enthusiasm. For though it should be the phantasy which is excited, we are accustomed to call the excitation enthusiasm. Moreover, those who ascribe enthusiasm to the temperatures of bodies, or the excellent temperament of the air, or the ascendancy of exhalations, or the aptitudes of times and places, or the agency of the bodies that revolve in the heavens, speak rather of the co-operating and material causes of the thing, than of the causes of it properly so called. You have therefore, for the producing cause of enthusiasm, the Gods; for the material cause, the enthusiastically-energizing soul itself, or the external symbols; for the formal cause, the inspiration of the Gods about *the one* of the soul; and for the final cause, good.

"If however, the Gods always wish the soul what is good, why does not the soul always energize enthusiastically? May we not say, that the Gods indeed always wish the soul what is good, but they are also willing that the order of the universe should prevail, and that the soul through many causes, is not adapted to enthusiasm, on which account, it does not always enthusiastically energize. But some say that the telestic art extends as far as to the sublunary region. If therefore, they mean, that no one of the superlunary, and celestial natures, energizes on the sublunary region, they evidently assert what is absurd. But if they mean that the telestæ, or mystic operators, are not able to energize above the lunar sphere, we say, that if all the allotments of souls are sublunary, their assertion will be true; but if there are also allotments of souls above the moon, as there are, (for some are the attendants of the sun, others of the moon, and others of Saturn, since the Demiurgus disseminated some of them into the earth, others into the moon, and others elsewhere,) - this being the case, it will be possible for the soul to energize above the moon. For what the whole order of things imparts to the soul, for a very extended period of time, this the soul is also able to impart to itself for a short space of time, when assisted by the Gods through the telestic art. For the soul can never energize above its own allotment, but can energize to the extent of it. Thus, for instance, if the allotment of the soul was as far as to philosophy, the soul would be able, though it should not choose a philosophic but some other life, to energize in that life somewhat philosophically. There are also said to be certain supermundane souls. And thus we have shown how the soul energizes enthusiastically.

"But how are statues said to have an enthusiastic energy? May we not say that a statue being inanimate, does not itself energize about divinity, but the telestic art purifying the matter of which the statue consists, and placing round it certain characters and symbols, in the first place renders it, through these means, animated and causes it to receive a certain life from the world; and in the next place, after this, it prepares the statue to be illuminated by a divine nature, through which it always delivers oracles, as long as it is properly adapted. For the statue when it has been rendered perfect by the telestic art, remains afterwards (endued with a prophetic power,) till it becomes entirely unadapted to divine illumination; but he who receives the inspiring influence of the Gods, receives it only at certain times, and not always. But the cause of this is, that the soul when filled with deity, energizes about it. Hence, in consequence of energizing above its own power, it becomes weary. For it would be a God, and similar to the souls of the stars, if it did not become weary. But the statue, conformably to its participations, remains illuminated. Hence the inaptitude of it entirely proceeds into privation, unless it is again *de novo* perfected and animated by the mystic operator. We have sufficiently shown therefore, that enthusiasm properly so called, is effected about *the one* of the soul, and that it is an illumination of divinity.

"In the next place, let us discuss the order, and the use of the four manias, and show why the philosopher makes mention of these alone. Is it because there are no other than these, or because these were sufficient for his purpose? That there are therefore, many other divine inspirations, and manias, Plato himself indicates as he proceeds, and prior to this, he makes mention of the inspiration from the Nymphs. But there are also inspirations from Pan, from the mother of the Gods, and from the Corybantes, which are elsewhere mentioned by Plato. Here however, he alone delivers these four manias; in the first place, because these alone are sufficient to the soul, in the attainment of its proper apocatastasis, as we shall afterwards show; and in the next place, because he delivers the

proximate steps of ascent to the soul. For the gifts of the Gods to all beings, are many and incomprehensible. But now he delivers to us the energies of the Gods which are extended to souls. He delivers however, these four manias, not as if one of them was not sufficient, and especially the amatory, to lead back the soul to its pristine felicity; but at present the series, and regular gradation of them, and the orderly perfection of the soul, are unfolded. As therefore, it is possible for the tyrannic life when suddenly changed, to become aristocratic, through employing strenuous promptitude, and a divine allotment, but the gradual ascent, is from a tyrannic to a democratic, and from this to an oligarchic life, afterwards to a timocratic, and at last to an aristocratic life, but the descent and lapse, are vice versa; - thus also here, the soul being about to ascend, and be restored to its former felicity, is in the first place, possessed with the musical mania, afterwards with the telestic, then with the prophetic, and in the last place, with the amatory mania. These inspirations however, conspire with, and are in want of each other; so abundant is their communion. For the telestic requires the prophetic mania; since the latter interprets many things pertaining to the former. And again, the prophetic requires the telestic mania. For the telestic mania perfects and establishes oracular predictions. Farther still, the prophetic uses the poetic and musical mania. For prophets, as I may say, always speak in verse. And again, the musical uses the prophetic mania spontaneously, as Plato says. But what occasion is there to speak about the amatory, and musical manias; for nearly the same persons exercise both these, as for instance, Sappho, Anacreon, and the like, in consequence of these not being able to subsist without each other. But it is very evident that the amatory mania contributes to all these, since it is subservient to enthusiasm of every kind: for no enthusiasm can be effected without amatory inspiration. And you may see how Orpheus appears to have applied himself to all these, as being in want of, and adhering to each other. For we learn that he was most telestic, and most prophetic, and was excited by Apollo; and besides this, that he was most poetic, on which account, he is said to have been the son of Calliope. He was likewise most amatory, as he himself acknowledges to Musæus, extending to him divine goods, and rendering him perfect. Hence he appears to have been possessed with all the manias, and this by a necessary consequence. For there is an abundant union, conspiration and alliance with each other, of the Gods who preside over these manias, *viz.* of the Muses, Bacchus, Apollo, and Love.

"It remains therefore, that we should unfold the nature of each of the manias, previously observing, that those which are internal, and originate from the soul itself, and give perfection to it, are of one kind; but the external energies of them, and which preserve the outward man, and our nature, are of another. The four external however, are analogous to the four internal manias. Let us consider therefore, in the first place, the internal, and which alone originate from the soul itself, and let us see what they effect in the soul. In order likewise, that this may become manifest, and also their arrangement, let us survey from on high, the descent, as Plato says, and defluxion of the wings of the soul. From the beginning therefore, and at first, the soul was united to the Gods, and its unity to their one. But afterwards, the soul departing from this divine union, descended into intellect, and no longer possessed real beings unitedly, and in one, but apprehended and surveyed them, by simple projections, and as it were, contacts of its intellect. In the next place, departing from intellect, and descending into reasoning and dianoia, it no longer apprehended real beings, by simple intuitions, but syllogistically, and transitively, proceeding from one thing to another, from propositions to conclusions. Afterwards, abandoning true reasoning, and the dissolving peculiarity, it descended into generation, and became filled with much irrationality and perturbation. It is necessary therefore, that it should recur to its proper principles, and again return to the place from whence it came. To this ascent and apocatastasis however, these four manias contribute. And the musical mania indeed, leads to symphony and harmony, the agitated and disturbed nature of the parts of the soul, which were hurried away to indefiniteness and inaptitude, and were filled with abundant tumult. But the telestic mania causes the soul to be perfect and entire, and prepares it to energize intellectually. For the musical mania alone harmonizes and represses the parts of the soul; but the telestic causes the whole of it to energize, and prepares it to become entire, so that the intellectual part of it may energize. For the soul by descending into the realms of generation, resembles a thing broken and relaxed. And the circle of *the same*, or the intellectual part of it is fettered; but the circle of *the different*, or the doxastic part, sustains many fractures and turnings. Hence, the soul energizes partially, and not according to the whole of itself. The Dionysiacal inspiration therefore, after the parts of the soul are co-harmonized, renders it perfect, and causes it to energize according to the whole of itself, and to live intellectually. But the Apolloniacal mania converts and co-excites all the multiplied powers, and the whole of the soul to *the one* of it. Hence Apollo is denominated, as elevating the soul from multitude, to *the one*. And the remaining mania, the amatory, receiving the soul united, conjoins this one of the soul to the Gods, and to intelligible beauty. As the

givers therefore of these manias are transcendently united, and are in each other, the gifts also on this account participate of, and communicate with, each other, and the recipient, which is the soul, possesses an adaptation to all the gifts. This therefore is the order, and these are the energies and powers within the soul itself, of these four manias.

"But let us also consider their external energies on man, and what they outwardly effect about us. The musical mania therefore, causes us to speak in verse, and to act and be moved rhythmically, and to sing in metre, the splendid deeds of divine men, and their virtues and pursuits; and through these, to discipline our life, in the same manner as the inward manias co-harmonize our soul. But the telestic mania, expelling every thing foreign, contaminating, and noxious, preserves our life perfect, and innoxious, and banishing an insane and diabolical phantasy, causes us to be sane, entire and perfect, just as the internal telestic mania, makes the soul to be perfect and entire. Again, the prophetic mania contracts into one, the extension and infinity of time, and sees as in one present now all things, the past, the future, and the existing time. Hence, it predicts what will be, which it sees as present to itself. It causes us therefore, to pass through life in an irreprehensible manner; just as the internal prophetic mania contracts and elevates all the multiplied, and many powers and lives of the soul, to *the one*, in order that it may in a greater degree be preserved and connected. But the amatory mania converts young persons to us, and causes them to become our friends, being instructive of youth, and leading them from sensible beauty, to our psychical beauty, and from this sending them to intelligible beauty; in the same manner as the internal amatory mania conjoins *the one* of the soul to the Gods.

"All the above-mentioned manias therefore, are superior to the prudent and temperate energies of the soul. Nevertheless, there is a mania which is co-ordinate with temperance, and which we say, has in a certain respect a prerogative above it. For certain inspirations are produced, according to the middle, and also according to the doxastic reasons of the soul, conformably to which artists effect certain things, and discover theorems beyond expectation, as Asclepius, for instance, in medicine, and Hercules in the practic life."

Afterwards, in commenting on what Plato says of the mania from the Muses, *viz.* "that it adorns the infinite deeds of the ancients," Hermeas observes, "that the inward energy in the soul of the poetic mania, by applying itself to superior and intelligible natures, imparts to subordinate natures harmony and order; but that the external divinely inspired poetry celebrates the deeds of the ancients, and instructs both its contemporaries and posterity, extending its energies every where." But Plato says, "that he who without the divinely-inspired mania of the Muses, expects to become a divine poet, will by thus fancying, become himself imperfect; and his poetry will be vanquished and concealed by the poetry which is the progeny of the mania." Hermeas adds, "For what similitude is there between the poetry of Choerilus and Callimachus, and that of Homer and Pindar? For the divinely-inspired poets, as being filled from the Muses, always invoke them, and extend to them all that they say."

243a "By Ilion we must understand the generated and material place, which is so denominated from *mud* and *matter* (παρὰ την ἰλυν και την υλην), and in which there are war and sedition. But the Trojans are material forms, and all the lives which subsist about bodies. Hence also the Trojans are called *genuine* (ιθαγενεις). For all the lives which subsist about bodies and irrational souls, are favourable and attentive to their proper matter. On the contrary, the Greeks are rational souls, coming from Greece, i.e. from the intelligible into matter. Hence the Greeks are called *foreigners* (επηλυδες), and vanquish the Trojans, as being of a superior order. But they fight with each other about the image of Helen, as the poet says [about the image of Eneas];

Around the phantom, Greeks and Trojans fight.

Iliad V, 451

Helen signifying intelligible beauty, being a certain *vessel* (ελενοη τις ουσια), attracting to itself intellect. An efflux therefore, of this intelligible beauty is imparted to matter through Venus; and about this efflux of beauty the Greeks fight with the Trojans [i.e. rational with irrational lives[†]]. And those indeed, that oppose and vanquish

[†] Conformably to this, Proclus in the fragments of his Commentaries, On the *Republic* of Plato says, "that all the beauty subsisting about generation from the fabrication of things, is signified by Helen; about which there is a perpetual battle of souls, till the more intellectual having vanquished the more irrational forms of life, return to the place from whence they originally came." For the beauty which is in the realms of generation, is an efflux of intelligible beauty.

matter, return to the intelligible, which is their true country; but those who do not, as is the case with the multitude, are bound to matter. As therefore, the prophet in the 10th book of the *Republic*, previously to the descent of souls, announces to them how they may return [to their pristine felicity,] according to periods of a thousand and ten thousand years; thus also Calchas predicts to the Greeks their return in ten years, the number ten being a symbol of a perfect period. And as in the lives of souls, some are elevated through philosophy, others through the amatory art, and others through the royal and warlike disciplines; so with respect to the Greeks, some act with rectitude through prudence, but others through war or love, and their return is different [according to their different pursuits]."

247c "Why does Plato say, that no one of the poets prior to him have, or of those that may follow him, will celebrate the supercelestial place, according to its dignity and worth? For he was not so arrogant as to think, that he alone had deservedly praised it. But what is here asserted is a thing of the following kind: If we understand by poets those who are the third from the truth [according to what Plato says in the 10th book of the *Republic*], i.e. the multitude of merely human poets [or poets that are not divinely-inspired], so as to make Homer and Orpheus an exception to these; for these, and also Hesiod and Musæus, have spoken concerning this place; the truth of what is asserted will be evident. For no one among the multitude of such like poets and artists, has celebrated this place as it deserves; but this has been accomplished by divinely-inspired poets alone, such as Homer and Orpheus. But if in what is here asserted, we are to understand all poets, so as to comprehend Homer likewise and Orpheus, it is evident that Plato must also include himself, as neither being himself able to speak of this place in a manner suitable to its dignity. It is just therefore, as if he had said, No human poet has deservedly praised the supercelestial place; but this has been alone effected by Apollo and the choir of the Muses.

But how having said, that no one has celebrated the supercelestial place according to its desert, does he now say, "We should dare to affirm the truth?" Is it that the truth must be asserted, as subsisting in human conceptions? For it is possible to speak the truth, yet not adequately. Thus he who says, that Socrates was not a bad man, nor impious, says indeed what is true, yet not what Socrates deserves to have said of him, as he does, who asserts that he was a good man, that he possessed scientific knowledge, was wise in divine concerns, and was dear to divinity. For he who says these things, praises Socrates in a way adequate to his desert. Plato therefore, says a thing of this kind, respecting the supercelestial place. But the words, "Especially when speaking concerning the truth," are asserted very arcanelly and theologically. For by *truth* here, he signifies the whole order of the Nights; and the *plain of Truth*, which he afterwards speaks of, obscurely indicates these. Theologians likewise peculiarly establish *Truth* in that place. For Orpheus speaking about Night says, "that she possesses the truth of the Gods," and

To her, prediction wholly *true* was giv'n.

She is also said to prophecy to the Gods. Homer too, indicates concerning this Goddess. For speaking about Jupiter, Sleep says,

Night, the great tamer both of Gods and men,
To whom I fled, preserved me from his wrath;
For he swift[†] Night was fearful to offend.

Iliad XIV, 259 &c

But Plato says, he shall *dare* to speak concerning it, because he is going to assert something *affirmatively* about it. The *dread* however, is, lest we should be led to something unappropriate and vile, in such like doctrinal concerns. He is also concordant in what he says about the supercelestial place, with what he asserts in [the first hypothesis of] the *Parmenides*, about the first principle of things. For he there indicates this principle by negations; except, that he absolutely denies all things of the first principle; but of the supercelestial place, he denies some things, and affirms others. For the Goddess Night is superior to certain orders, but inferior to others; and as the first principle of things is superessential, so Night is supercelestial [i.e. is above that intellectual order which is denominated Heaven]. Why, however, are souls not said to see Heaven, but to become situated in, and be conjoined with it; but are not conjoined with the natures above Heaven, but perceive them only? In answer to this, it may be said, that it

[†] The Chaldean Oracles call the intelligible Gods *swift*, and *Night* subsists at the summit of the order of Gods, which is both intelligible, and intellectual, and is therefore absorbed in the intelligible. Hence Homer divinely denominates *Night*, *swift*.

is necessary contact should exist, as far as to a certain thing. Why therefore, as far as to this? Because neither are the Gods under Jupiter, said to be united to Phanes, but this is alone asserted of Jupiter, and he is said to be united through Night as a medium.

But how does Plato say, that the supercelestial place is *without colour*? Is it in the same manner as we say, that nature and soul are colourless? But what is there admirable in asserting this? And if we admit this, what will there be transcendent in the supercelestial place, since the same thing is possessed both by nature and soul? May we not say, that Plato, in what is here asserted, very much follows the before-mentioned theologians, and disposes what he says, conformably to them? For after the order of Nights, there are three orders of Gods, *viz.* of Heaven, the Cyclops, and the Centimani [or Gods with a hundred hands], the proper names of whom, Plato denies of the supercelestial place. For of the Gods which abide within Phanes, Heaven is the first that becomes visible from him; for Heaven and Earth first proceeded out of Phanes; and Heaven is first illuminated by the divine light of Phanes; since Orpheus says that Night is united to him.

No eye but that of sacred Night alone,
Beheld Protogonus: for all the rest
Were lost in wonder at th'unhop'd-for light,
Which glitter'd from th'immortal Phanes' skin.

But that which is visible and illuminated, is coloured, since colours are certain illuminations. Hence Night and all the supercelestial place, being above Heaven which is visible, they are very properly said to be without colour. For night also is opposed to day, because the latter is illuminated and coloured. And through *the privation of colour* indeed, Plato manifests that the place of the Nights is above the kingdom of Heaven; but through *the privation of figure*, that it is above the order of the Cyclops. For theology says, that figure is first unfolded into light in these, and that the divinities, the Cyclops, are the first principles and causes of the figures which subsists every where. Hence theology says, that they are *manual artificers*. For this triad[†] is perfective of figures.

And in their forehead, one round eye was fix'd.

Hesiod Theog. v. 145

In the *Parmenides* likewise, Plato when he speaks of the straight, the circular, and that which is mixed [from both these], obscurely indicates this order. But these Cyclops, as being the first causes of figures, taught Minerva and Vulcan the various species of figures.

These the first manual artists were, who taught
Pallas and Vulcan all things.

[says Orpheus]. We must not therefore wonder, on hearing that Vulcan and Minerva are the causes of figures. For Vulcan is the cause of corporeal figures, and of every mundane figure; but Minerva, of the psychical and intellectual figure; and the Cyclops of divine, and the every where existing figure. Hence, it is evident, that the supercelestial place is above the order of the Cyclops.

But by *the privation of contact*, Plato manifests that this place is above the *Centimani*: for these first come into contact, as it were, with all the fabrication of things. Hence theology denominates them *hundred-handed*: for through the hands we touch, make, and distinguish all things. Farther still, the touch pervades through the whole body. Theology therefore symbolically calls these *hundred-handed*, as *touching* all the fabrication of things, and being the causes of it. The triad,[‡] however, of the Centimani, is of a guardian nature. But Plato adduces negatively, what he found celebrated affirmatively by the theologian. For what Orpheus calls *Night*, that Plato denominates *without colour*. And what the former says negatively, is *without falsehood*.

Prediction without falsehood, was to Night
Of all things given.

[says Orpheus.] That the latter celebrates, as *having about it the genus of true science, and as being truly existing essence*. Plato also having celebrated the supercelestial place by three negations, again adduces three affirmations, introducing three of them from being. For since this order is a triadic one, Plato very properly preserves the

[†] The triad of the Cyclops consists of Brontes, Steropes, and Arges.

[‡] This triad consists of Cottus, Gyges, and Briareus.

triadic, both in the negative and affirmative conclusions. Or it may be said, that since it is both one and being, and is triadic according to each of these, he indicates the negative conclusions according to being. Here, likewise the first number is unfolded into light."

According to Hermeas, *the governor of the soul* signifies *the one of the soul*, which he informs us, was also the opinion of Iamblichus; but I prefer the explanation of it given by Proclus, in these Commentaries, *viz.* that it is a partial intellect of the Minerval series.

In the next place, Hermeas enumerates the different kinds of truth as follows: "Superior illuminate subordinate natures with the light of truth. We must extend the eye of intellect therefore to these four; *viz.* *the one*, which is the first principle of things; Phanes, who is the boundary of the intelligible, but the exempt principle of the intellectual Gods; (for the Nights are principles with which principle is co-ordinate) Jupiter, who is the king of the supermundane, but the boundary of what are properly called the intellectual Gods; and the Sun, who is the king of sensible natures. But each of these illuminates the beings that are under it, with the truth, which it possesses from an order placed above that which it illuminates. Thus, the Sun imparts supermundane light to sensibles; and hence the essence of it is said to be from supermundane natures. Again, Jupiter illuminates supermundane essences with intellectual light; Phanes illuminates the intellectual Gods with intelligible light; and the principle of all things fills the intelligible Gods and all things, with the divine light proceeding from himself."

248c "Adrastea (says Hermeas in his Scholia on the *Phædrus*,) is a divinity seated in the vestibules of Night, and is the offspring of Melissus and Amalthea. Melissus therefore, is to be assumed as a power providentially attending to secondary natures; but Amalthea must be considered according to the uninclining, and the uneffeminate. Hence Adrastea was generated from uninclining Providence, and she is the sister of Ida.

The beauteous Ida, and Adrastea sprung
From the same sire.

This Goddess therefore, unically comprehends and contains in herself at once, the centres of all laws, *viz.* of the mundane, and the supermundane, of those of Fate, and those of Jupiter; for there are Jovian and Saturnian, divine, supermundane, and mundane laws. On this account she is called Adrastea, because her legislative decrees are inevitable. Hence, she is said to be seated with brazen drumsticks in her hands, before the cave of Night, and through the sound produced by her cymbals, to render all things obedient to her laws. For Phanes indeed is seated within the cave, in the adytum of Night; but Night sits in the middle of the cave, prophesying to the Gods; and Adrastea sits in the vestibules, legislatively promulgating the divine laws. She differs however, from the justice which is there, after the same manner as the legislative differs from the judicial characteristic. And the justice which is there, is said to be the daughter of the Law and Piety which are there. But Adrastea herself, who is the offspring of Melissus and Amalthea, is likewise comprehensive of Law. These therefore, are said to have nurtured Jupiter in the cavern of Night; the theologian directly asserting that which Plato says about Jupiter. For Plato represents him fabricating, and promulgating laws. But divine law is imparted by Adrastea to the Gods also: for the order which is in them is derived from this Goddess. It is however, likewise imparted to the attendants of the Gods, and in common to all, and peculiarly to each."

248c For the sake of more fully understanding what Proclus refers to in this place, and also for the sake of the Platonic reader, the following translation of an extract from the Scholia of Hermeas on the *Phædrus* is given. The text of Plato, respecting the first descent of the soul from the intelligible world into the realms of generation, on which the extract is a comment, is as follows:

"This is the law of Adrastea, that whatever soul attending on divinity, has beheld something of reality, shall be free from damage till another period takes place: and that if she is always able to accomplish this, she shall be perpetually free from the incursions of evil. But when through an impotency of accomplishing this, she has not perceived reality, and from some fortuitous occurrence and being filled with oblivion, and depravity, she becomes heavy and drowsy, breaks her wings, and falls again on the earth, then this law prevents her in her first generation, from being implanted in some brutal nature, but commands the soul, which has seen the most, to inform the body of a philosopher, or of one desirous of beauty; of a musician, or of one devoted to love. But it orders the soul whose perceptions rank in the second class, to descend into a legitimate king, or of a man studious of empire and

war. But it distributes a soul of the third order, into a certain political character, or the ruler of a family, or the master of a trade. And again, it distributes a soul of the fourth rank, into one engaged in gymnastic exercise, or in procuring remedies, and taking care of the body. But souls of the fifth order, it distributes into a prophetic, or certain telestic life. In the sixth, it makes a distribution into a poetic or imitative life. In the seventh, into a husbandman, or an artificer. In the eighth, into a sophist, or popular character. And in the ninth, into a tyrannic life. But in all these, he who passes his life justly, will afterwards obtain a better condition of being; but he who acts unjustly, will pass into a worse state of existence. For no soul will return to its pristine condition till the expiration of ten thousand years; since it will not recover the use of its wings before this period; except it is the soul of one who has philosophised sincerely, or together with philosophy has been a lover of youth. These indeed, in the third period of a thousand years, if they have thrice chosen this mode of life in succession, and have thus restored their wings to their natural vigour, shall in the three thousandth year, return to their pristine abode."

248c The Scholia of Hermeas on this passage, are as follow:

"Whatever soul, says Plato, following its proper God, is able to perceive something of intelligibles, will remain without injury during the whole of that period, i.e. will not fall into generation. For to fall into generation, is to be injured. And you may see how accurately here, in the same manner as before, he exhibits to us the difference between divine, and human souls. For he does not merely say, *if it has seen* [reality] but, *if it has seen something* [of reality]; i.e. if it has seen what is partially and individually real. If therefore, in the beginning of the period, it has seen something of real being, it will remain uninjured till another period. For the sacred law of Adrastea antecedently comprehends the progressions of all the Gods, and of all souls, and imparts that which is adapted to each. Hence, as the reward of having seen something of reality, in the beginning of the period, it will, during the whole of that period, remain on high, and revolve in conjunction with the Gods. For its adaptation to the period will sustain it; just as here, some things live for one solar period, others for two, and others only for a day, through being adapted to a certain position of the stars. Certain dæmons also by their sustaining aid, keep souls from falling into generation, just as we see here, bodies that are well born, though they should be badly nourished, yet at the same time, remain healthy, through their natural condition from the beginning; and though they endeavour to perform certain defiled actions, yet are prevented by certain good dæmons from accomplishing them. After the same manner therefore, the soul that has once beheld something of intelligibles, is assisted and supported by good dæmons and heroes, so as not to fall into generation in that period. But when the soul being unable to follow the Gods, no longer perceives something of reality, Plato enumerates many causes of its lapse into generation. The first cause therefore, which he assigns of this is, its inability of following the [perpetual] attendants of the Gods. The second is, its being unable to perceive something of intelligibles. The third is, a fortuitous occurrence; and this is probably the occurrence of certain malefic dæmons. For the soul departing from the Gods, meets with evil dæmons, who enkindle its desires of associating with generation. Hence a similar thing takes place, as when some one follows his preceptor, Socrates for instance, or some other worthy teacher; for then he becomes modest and worthy, and participates of a certain good. But if he abandons his preceptor, he meets with intemperate and impudent men, who excite him to desires contrary to modesty and worth. The fourth cause, is the entire oblivion of intelligibles, and the power of the soul which is effective of difference, and of a life conversant with generation. For from these causes, the soul becomes heavy, is filled with the potion of oblivion, and fettered with the bonds of generation, and departs from and becomes entirely forgetful of intelligibles. For this is the depravity of the soul, which causes the defluxion of her wings, and her descent to earth.

But when Plato says, "*the soul falls again on the earth,*" by *earth*, he may mean, *all generation*; he may also intend to signify this earth properly so called; and he may also mean this human body, into which the soul enters, through its most abundant participation of earth. The law of Adrastea therefore grants this to the soul in her first falling from the intelligible into generation, that she shall not enter into the body of a brute, but into that of a man. For Plato calls the first generation, the descent of the soul into the realms of generation, and her giving completion to this animal frame, after her vision of the intelligible.

In the next place, it must be observed, that the nine lives which are here delivered, differ from those mentioned in the [10th book of the] Republic. For the lives which are here delivered are nine, but those in the *Republic*, are infinite. The latter also, are allotted conformably to the elections of the soul; but the former are distributed, according to the reward and honour merited by the vision of the intelligibles. And in the latter indeed, the

transition of the soul, is from a man into a brute, and from a brute into a man; but in the former, the transition is only into man, and this into the male, and not into the female. That likewise, which is the greatest thing of all, is this, that here, the soul first proceeds from the intelligible into generation; but in the *Republic*, it proceeds from one life to another. And in short, by accurately surveying, you will find many differences between the former and the latter lives. Farther still, this also must be mentioned by us as necessary, that here the species or forms themselves of lives, are enumerated, but not entirely the fortunes of them, and external circumstances, such for instance as a military, or royal life; nor entirely a life which is conversant with arms, and employs a fortune of a particular kind.

It remains therefore to be investigated, whether the whole extent of life is to be divided into these nine lives, or whether a certain other division besides these, is left, which will make for us, ten or more lives. For it is possible to divide the same thing, according to different conceptions, into a greater or less number of parts. Thus in the *Philebus*, the division is into three, but in the *Republic*, into five, lives. It must be demonstrated by us however, that now the whole extent of life may be distributed into these nine lives. These four things therefore, being surveyed about man, *viz.* *reason, anger, desire, and nature*, the soul descending into generation, lives either according to reason alone, yielding in nothing to the passions, nor suffering any thing from them, and in this case, she produces the first life which is the philosophic. Or she lives according to anger, reason at the same time having dominion, and she produces the second life, which is royal and military. Or she lives according to desire, again reason possessing the empire of the soul, and she makes the third life, which is political, and also pertains to the acquisition of wealth. For this life is employed in procuring necessary food for the animal and the city. Or again, the soul is conversant with nature, reason still presiding, and she produces the gymnastic and medicinal life. For this life, is converted to nature and bodies, providentially attending to, and procuring remedies for them. Since therefore, we have proceeded, as far as to the end of the progression of life according to nature, the fifth life remains, which is the telestic, and which does not possess a peculiar power. For this life is converted to the Gods, and from thence affords a certain assistance to the lives that precede it. But Plato assumes here the prophetic and telestic life, not the enthusiastic; for this is philosophic in the extreme, and scientific, and the whole of it is inspired by divinity; but he assumes this artificial and medicinal life, which through sacrifices and prayers, affords a certain aid to the human race. And these indeed, are the five lives, which are effected according to right reason, and are assimilated to the energies which subsist about divinity. For each of the Gods abides, proceeds, and returns to the principle of his progression. Here therefore, the soul either abides in reason, and produces the philosophic life; or she proceeds as far as to nature, and produces the other three lives; or she is converted to the Gods, and produces the fifth life.

Of the remaining four lives however, which are imitative, and the images of those that are prior to them, two of them, *viz.* the sixth and the seventh, truly imitate those that precede them, the one through words, but the other through deeds. So that the remaining four, are imitative of the prior lives; but two of them imitate truly, and the other two dissimilarly. The sixth and seventh lives also, which are truly imitative, differ in this, that the one imitates through words, the philosopher, the king, and the remaining characters, and thus disciplines men; but the seventh imitates through deeds; for such is the artificer. And the eight and ninth dissimilarly imitate; the one again through words, but the other through deeds. But in the *poetic*, consider every imitative character included, to which also the painter belongs; these characters, as Plato says in the *Republic*, being the third from the truth. For the *demiurgic* character, he is to be assumed who leads a thing from non-being to essence, such as the carpenter, the potter, and the shoe-maker. Among these likewise, the *husbandman* is included, so far as he pays attention to nature, in order that her germinations may be healthy and most excellent. The *sophistical* however, and *popular* characters, differ in this, that the sophist is a teacher of the laws and virtue; but the popular character exercises rhetoric among the vulgar. But we must not now assume the distorted sophistical and tyrannical lives, but those that use these powers to a good purpose, the former by deception, but the latter by force. For it is possible to use these both well and ill, as Plato also infers. And thus much concerning the nine lives.

It now remains, that we should collect by human scientific reasoning, what the nature is of the intelligibles, by the contemplation of which the soul descends into the first, second, and following lives. The soul therefore, which has surveyed the beautiful, the wise, and the good, since these beginning from the first principles, proceed as far as to the last of things, descends into the first life. Hence also it is reasonable to suppose, that the soul which has surveyed wisdom itself, will choose the philosophic life; but that the soul which has surveyed the beautiful itself, will choose a life which is studious of elegance; and this Plato divides into the musical and amatory life. For receiving beauty either through the eyes, or the ears, we obtain a reminiscence of intelligible beauty. But the reascent to all the lives is to *the good*. Again, the soul which has surveyed the genera of being, will choose the

second life. For a king establishes all things, and is therefore analogous to *permanency*,[†] from which also, he is denominated βασιλευς, i.e. from a *basis and stability, and giving firmness to things*: (παρὰ την βασιν και το εδραιον, και το βεβηκεναι απ_ αυτου τα πραγματα.) He likewise *moves* or excites all things, by arranging and adorning every thing, through which he is analogous to *motion*. He is also the cause of friendship and union to all things through common laws, which it is the province of *sameness* to effect. And he divides every thing, and represses whatever is hostile and injurious; and this is the employment of *difference*. He likewise rules over all things; and on this account he is said to be warlike, and a prince. But as causing all things [in the city] to *exist*, may he not be said to subsist analogous to *essence*, in consequence of leading each thing from non-being to existence.

Again, when the soul has surveyed the genera of being more partially, and no longer totally, or has [principally] surveyed justice itself, she produces the third life: for those who are assumed in the third life, are in a greater degree conversant with justice. The soul which has surveyed health itself, and body itself, makes the fourth life. And the soul which has beheld the everlasting Gods produces the prophetic or telestic life. The remaining four lives however, have surveyed similitude itself; but the two first have surveyed in a greater degree similitude, and the two last dissimilitude.

Plato therefore, having spoken concerning the lives, and the genera distributed to souls descending into generation, from the intelligible prior to generation, briefly discusses in what remains, the conduct of the soul during its fallen condition, conformably to what is said in the *Republic*; viz. that the soul which has passed through this life in a just and holy manner, shall obtain a more excellent, but the soul that has acted unjustly, a worse, condition of being. Having likewise, led the soul into the realms of generation, he again elevates it to the intelligible, and says, that every soul such as the souls of the multitude, is restored to the intelligible, through ten thousand years; but that the soul of a philosopher is restores through three thousand years. Since however, he makes mention of a period of a myriad, and of three thousand years, and farther still of the period of a thousand years, from a progression from generation into generation, let us first explain the mathematical meaning of what is said, and afterwards investigate what he wishes to indicate.

He defines then, in the *Republic*, the measure of the life of man to be a hundred years, this number being the square of ten, which comprehends in itself all the forms of numbers. Afterwards, if you multiply a hundred by ten, you will produce the cube a thousand. This, as being terrestrial, and adapted to earth, Plato attributes to it, and says, that the progression of the soul under the earth, i.e. its progression from generation to generation, consists of a thousand years, in order that the punishment of its offences, or the reward of its good deeds, may take place in a tenfold degree. Farther still, this also must be pre-assumed, that the soul which is about to be restored to its pristine felicity, must have chosen a philosophic life. Let there be therefore, a soul that has lived the nine lives; but it remains after these, that one life which is apocatastatic, must, as we have said, be investigated; and this we shall have ten lives. Hence since the progression of each life under the earth, consists of a thousand years, ten times one thousand will produce a myriad of years. Since also it is necessary that the soul which is returning to its pristine felicity, should have philosophized thrice, as Plato says, again three thousand years will be produced. Perhaps too, Plato assumed this from history. For thus Hermes Trismegistus received the appellation of Trismegistus, because he had thrice philosophized on the earth, and the third time knew himself. And Pindar says,

But they who in true virtue strong
The *third* purgation can endure;
And keep their minds from fraudulent wrong,
And guilt's contagion pure;
They thro' the starry paths of Jove
To Saturn's blissful tower remove.

Olymp. ii. v. 123, &c

Such therefore, as I have said, is the mathematical meaning of the words. And in short, three and ten multiply the journey of a thousand years under the earth, that is, the progression from generation into generation, and make three thousand and a myriad.

What then does Plato obscurely signify through these numbers? It must be said, that three thousand and a myriad, are symbols of perfection. For Plato does not mean what the mathematical signification of the words

[†] The genera of being are, essence, permanency, motion, sameness, and difference.

seem to indicate. For if this were the case, there would be an apocatastasis of every soul in a myriad of years, and thus this world would become destitute of souls. But this is impossible, as is also evident from what is related of Aridæus in [the tenth book of] the *Republic*, who was many thousand years under the earth, and yet was not able to ascend from the mouth, though other souls ascended from it. Plato therefore, does not intend to signify a mathematical and arithmetical multitude of years, but measures of perfections, and gradations of first, middle, and last souls. For some souls make their apocatastasis more swiftly, but others more slowly, and some require but a little, but others an abundant, purification. And three is a perfect number, containing the beginning, middle, and end. Ten also is a perfect number, subsisting according to another form [i.e. according to a form different from that of three], and comprehending in itself all numbers. Three likewise, is analogous to three thousand, and ten to a myriad: for each of them is a monad, and is comprehensive of all numbers. On all these accounts therefore, Plato uses three thousand and a myriad, manifesting by these numbers, that those who philosophize perfectly, make their apocatastasis to the intelligible in a shorter time, as requiring but little or no purification; but that the souls of the multitude make their apocatastasis in a longer time, as being in want of much punishment and purification. A thousand also manifests a certain measure of the perfection of the soul that is purified under the earth; which having obtained, it again comes into generation, and having lived well or ill on the earth, again acquires its requisite perfection under the earth. Hence, these periods do not entirely manifest so great a multitude of years, so as that souls make their apocatastases in such a great length of time, but they symbolically signify, a certain proper measure of perfection; through which the soul receiving what is adapted to it, and obtaining its perfection, is restored to its pristine felicity.

250b "Plato every where says, that the sovereign Sun is analogous to the first principle of things. For as here the sun is the sovereign of the whole sensible world, so is the first principle in the intelligible world. And as from the sovereign Sun light descends, which conjoins, connects, and unites that which is visive with that which is visible; after the same manner also, the light proceeding from the first God, and which Plato calls truth, conjoins intellect with the intelligible. You see therefore that beauty imitates this light. For it is, as it were, a light, emitted from the fountain of intelligibles to this visible world, alluring and calling upward all things to itself, and uniting the lover with the object of love. Hence also, elevation [to the intelligible] is effected through it. Plato therefore, summarily says, that intelligibles are the objects to which Love elevates. For the beauty, which is here, is obscure and sensible, (just as the light which is here, is mingled with air,) and leads us to the reminiscence of beauty itself.

But when he says, "*We were then permitted to see splendid beauty;*" he means beauty itself coruscating, without any mixture of its contrary. And *the happy choir*, in conjunction with which we then revolved, consists of divine souls, which on account of their united subsistence, are called a choir. But he now denominates a choir, that which he before called *the army of Gods and dæmons*. It is likewise properly called by him happy. For in reality, he who surveys those forms is happy and blessed.

Again, when he says, "*We indeed following with Jupiter,*" it must be observed, that in the *Timæus*, he represents the Demiurgus when he is making the world, disseminating souls equal in number to the stars, i.e. equal according to forms. Hence, making some of them to be Solar, others Lunar, and other Jovian, &c., he disseminated some of them into the Earth, but others into the other instruments of time. Plato therefore now says, "*We indeed following with Jupiter,*" as knowing his proper God [i.e. the God to whose series he belonged]. For this is the felicity of the human soul, to revolve in conjunction with appropriate Gods; since it is not possible to pass beyond the Gods.

When also he says, "*Being initiated,*" he denominates *initiation* (τελετη) from the soul being rendered by it *perfect* (παρὰ το τελεῶν την ψυχην ἀποτελεῖν.) You see therefore, that the soul was once perfect. Hence, when it is on the earth, it becomes divided, and the whole of it is not able to energize by itself. He likewise says, "*Which may be lawfully called.*" For the *vision* of them is not simply most blessed; since the perceiver sees, as being different from that which is seen. It is necessary however, that union should take place. The establishment therefore in these objects of vision, is most blessed. But it is necessary to know that *telete* (τελετη) is one thing, *muesis* (μῆσις) another, and *epopteia* (εποπτεῖα) another. *Telete* therefore, is analogous to that which is preparatory to purifications, and the like. But *muesis*, which is denominates from closing the eyes, is more divine. For to close the eyes, is no longer to receive those divine mysteries by sense, but to behold them with the soul itself. And *epopteia* is to be established in, and become a spectator of them. He likewise says, "*These divine orgies were performed by us,*" because to perform orgies, and the mysteries, is called *orgiazein* (οργιαζειν).

Again, when Plato says, "*Being ourselves then entire,*" he speaks of those divine mysteries, as a spectator; and uses the word *entire* for *perfect*. When also, he says, "*The evils which awaited us in a posterior time,*" he signifies that the communion of the body becomes the cause of the lapse of the soul. But by the word *stable*, he indicates the firm and constant nature of intelligibles. The expressions *closed eyes*, and *epoptic spectators*, are derived from the Eleusinian mysteries. He also says, we were spectators "*in a pure light, being ourselves pure,*" because the splendor in the sublunary region is not pure; for it is mingled with air. But we ourselves were then pure, because it is not lawful for that which is impure to be conjoined with that which is pure. And lastly, as oysters are bound to their shell, so are we to the body.

. "But with respect to other souls, such as follow divinity in the best manner, and become similar to its nature, raise the head of the charioteer into the supercelestial place; where he is born along with the circumference: but is disturbed by the course of the horses, and scarcely obtains the vision of perfect realities. Other souls however, at one time raise, and at another depress, the head of the charioteer: and through the violence of the horses, they partly see indeed, and are partly destitute of vision. And again, other souls follow, all of them affecting the vision of this superior place; but from being unable to accomplish this design, they are carried round in a merged condition, trampling on, and attacking each other, through a contention of precedency in their course. Hence the tumult, contest, and perspiration are extreme. And here indeed, many become lame through the fault of the charioteers, many break many of their wings, and all of them involved in mighty labour, depart destitute of the perception of reality; but after their departure they use a doxastic nutriment; through which there is a great endeavour to behold where *the plain of Truth* is situated. For from a meadow of this kind, that which is best in the soul receives convenient nutriment; and from this, the nature of the wing is nourished, by which the soul is enabled to ascend."

247b The following are the elucidations of Hermeas on this passage: "Plato having spoken concerning divine souls, and those that always subsist invariably the same, now passes to our partial and human souls, which are sometimes able to follow divinity, and sometimes abandon a divine nature. Hence, he manifests them by the indefinite word *others*, as possessing much depravity and wandering. He also divides these triply, into first, middle, and last. For he had likewise, given a triadic division to the natures of a superior order. Hence, of the spectacles, he says, that some are within the Heaven, others, in the sub-celestial arch, and others, beyond the Heaven. And again, of the spectacles beyond the Heaven he says, that the truly-existing essence which is in the super-celestial place, is *without colour, without figure, and without contact*. Prior to this likewise, he made a division into Jupiter and Vesta, and the ten leaders: and again into Jupiter, Gods, and dæmons: or again, into Jupiter, and those that always follow him, when they are willing and able.[†] For universally, every thing which has once proceeded from the first principle, ought to be triadic. For being perfect it will have a first, middle, and last, conformably to what the [Chaldean] Oracle says, "*The triad measuring all things.*" Thus therefore, respecting our souls, he says that some of them raise the head of the charioteer, i.e. the summit of our intellect, to the super-celestial place; but that others, sometimes raise the head, and sometimes do not; and that others, are not able to raise it, but are borne downward to generation. It must also be accurately observed, how he indicates the difference between our souls and those that are divine. For in speaking of our highest felicity, and assuming the soul which is most excellently assimilated to divinity, he says, that it is scarcely able, through being disturbed by the horses, to raise the head of the charioteer to the place beyond the Heaven; to perceive something of real beings; and thus to stand on the back of the Heaven, as in a watch-tower, surveying different objects at different times. And divine souls indeed, are said to be carried round by the circulation of the Heaven; but our souls, to be carried round in conjunction [συμπεριαγασθαι] [with those that are divine].

But by the *head* of the charioteer, we must understand, the highest and most intellectual part of the soul, which unically possesses all the intellectual power of it. Since therefore, the soul is multipotent, and the other powers of it also wish to energize, hence souls of the first rank, are very properly said to be *disturbed* by the horses. But souls of the middle rank, which have not perfectly disciplined their other powers, are not merely said to be disturbed, but to be *forced* by the horses; and hence, at one time, they energize according to their summit, and at another again, according to their more subordinate part. And souls of the third rank, are entirely vanquished by the horses; on which account, being unable to raise the head of the charioteer, they become in a merged condition. Take also examples of these from characters on the earth. And let an example of a soul of the first rank be a

[†] And these, as they are sometimes willing and able to follow Jupiter, and sometimes not, make with Jupiter, a triadic division.

philosopher who is at leisure[†] with himself, and for contemplation, but who imparts good alone to the other lives of himself, and to every thing in his vicinity. But let the political character be the image of souls of the middle rank; at one time being extended to contemplation, and at another again, being converted to, and arranging things of a subordinate nature. And let souls of the third rank, be analogous to the vulgar and impassioned man. Moreover, there is a great extent in souls of the middle rank, in consequence of their perceiving some things, but not perceiving others. For some indeed, have seen many things, but have not seen a few; but others vice versa, have seen a few, but have not seen many things; and others, have equally seen some things, and have not seen others. This therefore, must be attended to; for it will contribute to our knowledge of the lives that are in a following order. Hence the souls that are the last of those that follow the Gods, as they naturally aspire after the supercelestial place, are convolved together with the Gods, but through their want of power to survey it, they tend downward. And at last, will and desire leave them: for will begins the first, and ends the last. As therefore, here on the earth, the vulgar and impassioned man, naturally indeed aspires after good, but is unable to distinguish and discover truly existing good, there also souls are affected after the same manner.

You may likewise assume other examples of the three orders of souls. Of the first order indeed, the temperate man; but of the second, the continent man, where, though there is a sedition between the subordinate and more excellent parts of the soul, yet at the same time, reason endeavours to preserve its authority. And of the last order, you may assume the incontinent, or the intemperate man as an example. And again, you may take, as an example of the first order, the worthy man, who neither accuses himself, nor another. For the first of souls are not disturbed through their own depravity, but through the nature of the subject thing, it being such as to cause perturbation. Hence also, we may dissolve the doubt which enquires, how it is said, *that the soul when perfect and winged, revolves on high, and governs the whole world?* For so far as the soul follows the Gods, and gives itself to them, it is happy. But souls of the middle class must be arranged conformably to one who makes a proficiency, and who accuses himself alone.

Again, when Plato adds, that souls of the third rank *are carried round in a merged condition*, he does not say that they *fall*, but that they are *merged*, as being enslaved by the violence and sedition of other powers, but at the same time, are convolved together with the attendants of the Gods, through aspiring after the supercelestial place. And of divine souls indeed, it is said, that the circulation of the Heaven convolves them, in consequence of their being adapted to this, and giving themselves to the circulation. But of souls of the third class it is said, that they are jointly convolved, as being borne along by violence; they indeed tending in a right-lined progression to generation, but at the same time being circularly convolved, through their being still carried by the Heaven, and the attendants of the Gods, just as the inflammable matter at the summit of the air, is said to be circularly borne along. These souls therefore, become in a merged condition, in consequence of their genesiurgic power gravitating, and wishing to energize: for with this power the irrational form of life is connected. When also it is said, that *they trample on each other*, it must not be supposed that they use feet there, but that one soul endeavours to be before another. The superior therefore, may be said to trample on the subordinate soul, and the subordinate to attack the superior. Souls of this kind however, are not extended to the intelligible, but look to each other, and contending with, endeavour to surpass each other.

Hence, a *perturbation* is produced in them of the dianoetic part, but a *contest* of anger; for it is anger which aspires after honour and precedency; and *an extreme perspiration* of the epithymetic and genesiurgic part, which afterwards proceeds into generation. But it is said to be *extreme*, in contradistinction to the divine perspiration of ascending souls, which Plato mentions in what follows. Here however alone, in souls of the third rank, he blames the charioteer, because it is the cause to them of a confusion of this kind; just as he says in the *Republic*, that it is impossible for the decorous condition of the city to be dissolved, without the depravity of the rulers. You may also assume from hence, that the whole soul descends according to Plato, if the charioteer which is the summit of it, becomes depraved, and that one part of the soul does not, as Plotinus says, descend, but another part abide on high.

Again, with respect to the *lameness* of these souls, this becomes known from the motion of those persons that are lame. For these proceed slowly, and inelegantly, and are in danger of falling. Thus therefore, these souls also, are more dull and inelegant in their intellectual conceptions, and are always in danger of being drawn down into

[†] Conformably to this Plato elsewhere says, that the genuine philosopher is nourished in truth and *leisure*. But at present, as true philosophy is not studied, and there are consequently, no genuine philosophers, every man is busily employed about external concerns, and no one is at leisure for speculations of the highest importance. "I am too busy, I have not a moment to spare for such things," is the common language of the high and the low, the rich and the poor.

generation. Hence, Plato assimilates their intellections to the walking of those that are lame; since walking is adapted [as an image] to their transitive intelligence. It is likewise beautifully observed by him, that many of these souls *break* their wings; for he does not say they *destroy* them, because the soul never loses its anagogic power; but its energies indeed become sluggish, and in this respect, may be said to perish, but the power remains broken. Farther still, we may derive an explanation of what is here said, from winged animals. For if any one of these *breaks* its wings, it is for a short time raised on high, through the winged nature which it possesses, but is again drawn downward. They *depart* therefore, he says, *destitute of the perception of reality*, i.e. they fly to that which is without God, and dark.

Heaven's exiles straying from the orb of light,

[as Empedocles says]. But they depart *destitute*, or *imperfect* i.e. *uninitiated*. For the vision of intelligibles is truly initiation. They likewise use *doxastic nutriment*, i.e. they exert the reasons or forms of sensibles, and live according to these, no longer surveying intelligibles, but sensibles.

Farther still, in the words, *through which there is a great endeavour, &c.* he delivers that which is common to the three orders of souls, as well of those that obtain the vision of intelligibles, as of those that do not. So that the answer to those who enquire, why therefore, do all souls thus endeavour and weary themselves to obtain this vision is, that all of them desire to perceive real beings. But by *the nutriment adapted to that which is best in the soul*, he means that which is adapted to the intellectual part of the soul; for this is alone appropriately nourished by the intelligible. But the wing of the soul, which is the anagogic power of it, is not *appropriately*, but *alone* nourished by the intelligible, and by nothing else. And *the meadow* is the prolific power of forms. The meadow also may be said to be the Nights: for there the fountains of life are contained. That however, is another meadow which is mentioned in the 10th Book of the *Republic*, in which souls about to proceed into generation dwell for a time. And this meadow is the luminous appearance (φασμα) which is under the moon. The meadow in the *Republic* however, is analogous to that which is here mentioned. For in the former, the principles of nature, and of the life in generation, are comprehended."

259d "Dancing here must not be understood literally, as if Terpsichore was propitious to those who engage in that kind of dancing which is the object of sense; for this would be ridiculous. We must say therefore, that there are divine dances; in the first place, the dance of the Gods; and in the second place, that of divine souls. In the third place, the revolution of the celestial divinities, *viz.* of the seven planets, and the inerratic sphere, is called a dance. In the fourth place, those who are initiated in the mysteries perform a certain dance. And in the last place, the whole life of a philosopher is a dance. Who then are those that honour the Goddess in the dance? Not those who dance well, but those who live well through the whole of the present existence, elegantly arranging their life, and dancing in symphony with the universe. Again, Erato is denominated from Love, and from making the works of Love, lovely; for she co-operates with Love. But Calliope is denominated from the eye; and Urania presides over astronomy. Through these two Goddesses we preserve our rational part from being in subjection to the irrational nature. For through sight surveying the order of the celestial Gods, we properly arrange our irrational part. And farther still, through rhythms, philosophy, and hearing, we elegantly dispose that which we contain of the disorderly and void of rhythm."

261c The Athenians established a temple of Rural Diana, because this Goddess is the inspective guardian of every thing rural, and represses every thing rustic and uncultivated. But the altars and temples of the Gods signify their allotments; as you may also call this mundane body, or apparent solar orb, the altar and temple of the sun, and of the soul of the sun.

With respect to the fable, a twofold solution may be given of it; one from history, more ethical, but the other transferring us to wholes. And the former of these is as follows: Orithya was the daughter of Erectheus, and the priestess of Boreas; for each of the winds has a presiding deity, which the telestic art, or the art pertaining to sacred mysteries, religiously cultivates. To this Orithya, then, the God was so very propitious, that he sent the north wind for the safety of the country; and besides this, he is said to have assisted the Athenians in their naval battles. Orithya, therefore, becoming enthusiastic, being possessed by her proper God Boreas, and no longer energizing as a human being (for animals cease to energize according to their own peculiarities when possessed by superior

causes) died under the inspiring influence, and thus was said to have been ravished by Boreas. And this is the more ethical explanation of the fable.

But the second, which transfers the narration to wholes, is as follows, and does not entirely subvert the former: for divine fables often employ transactions and histories in subserviency to the discipline of wholes. They say, then, that Erectheus is the God that rules over the three elements, air, water, and earth. Sometimes, however, he is considered as alone the ruler of the earth, and sometimes as the presiding deity of Attica alone. Of this deity, Orithya is the daughter. And she is the prolific power of the earth, which is indeed co-extended with the word *Erectheus*, as the unfolding of the name signifies. For it is *the prolific power of the earth flourishing and restored according to the seasons*. But Boreas is the providence of the Gods supernally illuminating secondary natures; for the providence of the Gods in the world is signified by Boreas, because this divinity blows from lofty places. But the elevating power of the Gods is signified by the south wind, because this wind blows from low to lofty places; and besides this, things situated towards the south are more divine. The providence of the Gods, therefore, causes the prolific power of the earth, or of the Attic land, to ascend, and proceed into the apparent.

Orithya, also, may be said to be a soul[†] aspiring after things above, from οἶονω and θεῖω, according to the Attic custom of adding a letter at the end of a word, which letter is here an ω. Such a soul, therefore, is ravished by Boreas supernally blowing. But if Orithya was hurled from a precipice, this also is appropriate. For such a soul dies a philosophic, not receiving a physical death, and abandons a *proairetic*,[‡] at the same time that she lives a physical life. And philosophy, according to Socrates in the *Phædo*, is nothing else than a meditation of death.

According to some, however, Socrates in what he here says about Orithya and Boreas does not admit the explanation of fables. But it is evident that he frequently does admit and employ fables. Now, indeed, he blames those explanations which make fables to be nothing more than certain histories, and unfold them into material causes, airs, and earth, and winds, which do not revert to true beings, nor harmonize with divine concerns. Hence, Socrates now says, If unfolding this fable I should recur to physical causes, and should assert that the wind Boreas, blowing vehemently, hurled Orithya as she was playing from the rock, and thus dying she was said to have been ravished by Boreas, - should I not speak absurdly? For this explanation which is adopted by the *wise*, viz. by those who are employed in physical speculations, is meagre and conjectural; since it does not recur to true beings, but to natures, and winds, airs and vortices, as he also says in the *Phædo*. He rejects, therefore, these naturalists, and those who thus explain this fable, as falling into the indefinite and infinite, and not recurring to soul, intellect, and the Gods. But when Socrates says that he considers such interpretations as the province of a man *very curious and laborious, and not entirely happy*, these words indicate the being conversant with things sensible and material. And the Centaurs, Chimæras, Gorgons, and Pegasuses, are powers which preside over a material nature, and the region about the earth.[†]

When Socrates also says, that he is not yet able to know himself, his meaning may be, either that he does not yet know himself as pure soul itself, but that as being in body he knows himself; or that he does not yet know himself, as he is known by divinity. For if ever any man knew himself, this was certainly the case with Socrates.

When likewise he says, "I do not contemplate these, but myself;" this is because he who knows himself knows all things. For in consequence of the soul being *παμμορφον ἀγαλμα* an omniform image, he beholds all things in himself. But by Typhon here we must understand that power which presides over the confused and disordered in the universe, or in other words over the last procession of things. The term *manifold*, therefore, in this place, must not be applied to the God Typhon, but to that over which he presides, as being in its own nature moved in a confused, disordered, and manifold manner. For it is usual with fables to refer the properties of the objects of providential care to the providing powers themselves.

Farther still, Socrates mentions Juno, as generating and adorning the beauty of the mundane fabrication; and hence she is said to have received the Cestus from Venus. But Achelous is the deity who presides over the much-honoured power of water. For by this mighty river, the God who is the inspective guardian of potable water is manifested. And Nymphs are Goddesses who preside over regeneration, and are ministrant to Bacchus the offspring of Semele. But this Bacchus supplies the regeneration of the whole sensible world.

[†] This is according to the psychical mode of interpreting fables. See my translation of Sallust *On the Gods and the World*. [TTS vol. IV.]

[‡] This is a life pertaining to her own will; for the soul in this case gives herself up to the will of divinity.

[†] For an account of divine fables, and specimens of the mode in which they ought to be explained, see my Introduction to the second Book of the *Republic*, in Vol. I [TTS vol. IX] of my translation of Plato.

But the Platonic Hermeas in his MS. Commentary on the *Phædrus*, and on that part of it in which Plato says, "There are indeed, other evils besides these, but a certain dæmon immediately mingles pleasure with most of them," admirably observes respecting dæmons as follows: "The distribution of good and evil originates from the dæmoniacal genus. For every genus transcending that of dæmons, uniformly possesses good. There are therefore, certain genera of dæmons, some of which adorn and administer certain parts of the world; but others certain species of animals. Hence, the dæmon who is the inspective guardian of life, hastens souls into that condition which he himself is allotted; as for instance, into injustice or intemperance, and continually mingles pleasure in them as a snare. But there are other dæmons transcending these, who are the punishers of souls, converting them to a more perfect and elevated life. And the first of these it is necessary to avoid; but the second sort we should render propitious. There are other dæmons however, more excellent than these, who distribute good in an uniform manner."