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I Introduction

The aim of this paper is to discuss the meaning of love towards the One in Proclus and Ioane Petritsi. First, we will look at the passages in Proclus' works where love towards the One is mentioned in order to gain an understanding of his interpretation. Secondly, we will examine whether Petritsi was referring to the works of Proclus when he wrote about love towards the One, and to what extent his understanding corresponds to that of Proclus.

Petritsi was a Georgian translator and commentator of Proclus' (5th century) *Elements of Theology*.¹ All we know about Petritsi's biography is that he lived around the turn of the 11th and 12th centuries. It can be assumed that he was educated in Constantinople by Michael Psellos and/or John Italos and then lived in the monastery of Gelati, the center of Georgian culture in the Middle Ages.² He got his nickname, Petritsi, from his intermediate stay in the Petritsoni Monastery (today's Batshkovo Monastery in Bulgaria).³ Petritsi may also have authored several philosophical works.⁴ However, only two of his works have survived: the translation of *On Human Nature* (Περὶ φύσεως ἀνθρώπου) by Nemesios of Emesa and the translation and a detailed commentary of *Elements of Theology* (Στοιχείωσις θεολογική) by Proclus.

As for why Petritsi chose to translate Proclus' work of all things, it can be answered that Petritsi – similar to Proclus – deals with the same philosophical-theological themes. He understands the One as

¹ See Ioane Petrizii, *Tomus I, Procli Diadochi ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΩΣΙΣ ΘΕΟΛΟΓΙΚΗ, Versio Hiberica*, (1940), ed. Kauchtschischvili (henceforth quoted as Petritsi, I, chapter+page+line).

² See Ketchagmadze (1970) 59 (in Georgian).

³ See Alexidze/Bergemann (2009) 1, n. 1; Gigineishvili (2007) 13–14.

⁴ Petritsi mentions in the commentary books that were translated by him. It can be assumed that some of the texts he translated and probably also commented on have not survived. He could be the translator of Aristotle's "Ta topika" and "Peri hermeneias". His name could also be connected with a Bible translation and numerous exegetical and hagiographical translations. See Kekelidze, (1960) 284 (in Georgian); Alexidze/Bergemann (2009) 2; Gigineishvili (2007) XVII.

the first cause, from which everything comes forth and to which everything desires. The first One is something that cannot be expressed and is beyond multiplicity. Nothing can be said about the One, as it is above all words and perfection. But it can be loved. Petritsi speaks of the love towards the One as a path of ascent back to the One. The love towards the One describes a process of ascent of the soul based on the soul's self-knowledge. Self-knowledge leads the soul to unification (ἕνωσις) with itself. The soul united with itself sees itself as a unity, and through its similarity with the One, it comes close to the One. And although it is only a momentary looking, the soul beholds the One and loves what it sees. Before we talk about the love towards the One, we must first discuss the descent of the soul so that it becomes clear why the soul desires towards the One.

II. Descent of the soul

Similar to Proclus,⁵ Petritsi also writes that the individual souls descend fully into the body.⁶ Petritsi intensifies the relevance of Proclus' thesis with reference to the Bible by speaking of the biblical Adam as a descended soul: "He [Moses] thinks that the soul of Adam, when it became intellectless, enveloped itself with the bodies and threw them [the soul] over itself."⁷ Similar to the single soul, Adam falls from paradise, separates from God, and become the first man.⁸

⁵ Proclus, *ET* (1963), ed. Dodds (henceforth quoted as Procl. *ET* Prop, page + line). Here Procl. *ET* Prop. 211, Dodds 184, 10–11: Πᾶσα μερικὴ ψυχὴ κατιοῦσα εἰς γένησιν ὅλη κάτεισι, καὶ οὐ τὸ μὲν αὐτῆς ἄνω μένει, τὸ δὲ κάτεισι.

⁶ Cf. Ioane Petritzii, *Opera. Tomus II, Commentaria in Procli Diadochi ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΩΣΙΣ ΘΕΟΛΟΓΙΚΗ*, (1937), ed. Nutsubidze/Kaukchischvili (henceforth quoted as Petritsi, II, chapter+page+line). Here: Petritsi II, 211, 206, 4-14; See also Gigineishvili (2003) 1139-1148.

⁷ Petritsi II, 209, 205, 12–13: ესთა იტყვს, ვითარმედ, უგონებო რაჲ იქმნა სულო ადამ, დაიოთნა და მოიბლარდნნა სხეულნი ესე. Trans. by Khubulava. For the expression "covering and thrown over body" Proclus uses the term περιβέβληνται χιτῶνας. See Proclus, *PT* (1968-97) ed. Saffrey and Westerink (henceforth quoted as Procl. *PT* book+chapter, page, line). Here: Procl. *PT* III 5, 19, 3-15; and Proclus in *Alc* (1954) ed. Westerink (henceforth quoted as Procl. *In Alc.* chapter+ line). Here: Procl. *in Alc.* 138,20-139,3.

⁸ There are two different reasons for the descent of the soul to be considered here. First, when Proclus speaks of the descent of the soul, we learn from him that the soul descends because it has a different essence than the intellect, that is, the essential difference between the cause and the caused is the reason for the descent. The principle of descent from the cause is, as stated in Procl. *ET* prop. 30, Dodds

Echoing Proclus, Petritsi also speaks of the individual soul descending entirely. To understand precisely what Petritsi means by this, we turn back to Proclus, who addresses the cause of the soul's descent in his commentary on Plato's *Timaeus*. There, he criticizes Plotinus and Theodorus of Asine for not understanding individual souls as such, in contrast to Iamblichus (because Plotinus, for example, thinks that the intellectual part of our soul remains above with the intellect).⁹ I.e., as souls that have fallen completely into matter and are therefore each peculiar.¹⁰ The reason why Proclus argues against Plotinus' thesis of souls that have not fully descended lies in his interpretation of Plato's works, which can be traced back to two specific passages. The first passage is in Plato's *Timaeus* 43de, which speaks of two cycles of souls. One circuit stands still, while the other is violently shaken by the earth, and fire). According to Proclus' interpretation, the soul does the second, equally important passage is found in Plato's dialogue *Phaedrus* 248a. Here, we are talking about a charioteer who is thought of as the summit of the soul. The charioteer crashes together with his horses,¹¹ and his crash is to be understood as the fall of the soul from intellect into matter. These two passages from Plato's dialogues are used by Proclus to understand divisible souls as having fallen entirely from the divine realm. Petritsi shares Proclus' view of the complete descent of the single soul. The question now is: Why does the soul completely descend and why does it forget who or what it really is? Petritsi's answer to this question is that the soul becomes dizzy on the realm of the intellect and therefore falls down from the womb of Kronos to the becoming and

34, 12-13, is to be read: Πᾶν τὸ ἀπὸ τινος παραγόμενον ἀμέσως μένει τε ἐν τῷ παράγοντι καὶ πρόεισιν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ. Secondly, when Petritsi speaks of Adam's fall from paradise.

⁹ Plotinus, *Enn* (1964-82) ed. Henry and Schwyzer (henceforth quoted as Plotinus, *Enn.*, chap., line). Here: Plotinus, *Enn.* IV 8, 8, 2: οὐ πᾶσα οὐδ' ἡ ἡμετέρα ψυχὴ ἔδω, ἀλλ' ἔστι τι αὐτῆς ἐν τῷ νοητῷ αἰεῖ.

¹⁰ Proclus, *in Tim.* (1903-6) ed. Diehl (henceforth quoted as Procl. *in Tim.* Book+page, line) III 333, 28-334, 5: ἀπὸ δὴ τούτων ὀρμώμενοι παρρησιασόμεθα πρὸς Πλωτῖνον καὶ τὸν μέγαν Θεόδωρον ἀπαθές τι φυλάττοντας ἐν ἡμῖν καὶ αἰεὶ νοοῦν· δύο γὰρ κύκλους μόνον εἰς τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς ψυχῆς παραλαβὼν ὁ Πλάτων τὸν μὲν ἐπέδησε, τὸν δὲ διέσεισεν, οὐδὲ τὸν πεπεδημένον οὔτε τὸν διασεισισμένον ἐνεργεῖν νοερώς δυνατόν. ὀρθῶς ἄρα καὶ ὁ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος διαγωνίζεται πρὸς τοὺς ταῦτα οἰομένους·

¹¹ Cf. Dodds (1963) 309-310.

born.¹² This passage is to be compared with Plato's *Phaedrus*, particularly with the passage where Socrates speaks about the fall of the soul.¹³ Petritsi refers to the *Phaedrus* passage as follows: "It [the soul] descends to become and rises again, as *Socrates* says, like a bird without wings, i.e. pteroruesasa [πτερορρησασα]."¹⁴ Petritsi's agreement with Proclus on the fall of the soul can be summarised and interpreted as follows: The crashed soul, which has lost its wings, is the reason why it no longer knows itself. This implies that the soul, which no longer follows the intellect but has completely fallen into matter, has even become a stranger to itself. But why does the soul lose its wings? This happens because the being (οὐσία) of the soul is not only immortal and eternal, but also consists of the power (δύναμις) and the activity (ἐνέργεια) directed towards the sensible realm.¹⁵

The soul loses its wings - that is, it descends from the intellect. However, this is not a process of which it is itself aware. Rather, it descends because the intellect, as the cause of the soul, is intrinsically better and different from the soul. This means that due to this essential difference, it is not possible for the soul to follow the intellect without further ado. While the being of the soul is the principle of movement and life, the intellect is nothing other than thinking itself. Therefore, the soul's fall can be seen as an inevitable, but not self-aware, consequence within the system of descent. According to the clarifications provided by Proclus and Petritsi, the being of the soul is not identical with thinking, but it can think, and it can think in the way it moves – that is, discursively, in a back-and-forth manner. The discursive thinking of the soul thus takes place temporally and successively as it desires towards itself and towards all causes within it. However, without knowing itself, who, or what it is, without a certain self-knowledge, the soul cannot

¹² Petritsi II, 26, 70, 23–28: ხოლო ოდეს განსაზიდას თანა გონიერისა ცისასა, ვითარ ბრუ-დართულ იქმნა და ვითარ ფრთა-დაყრილ მიცილებისაგან, მაშინ შთამოიჭრა უბეთაგან კრონოსთა და ვიდრე ქმნადთა და შობათამდე შთამოეკუეთა. ვინაჲ წყმიდნა მან სამნი იგი ნეტარებითნი წყარონი. და ესე სხუად და სხუად მიქმნისათჳს სულთაჲსა, რომელ არს მიდრეკაჲ.

¹³ Cf. Plato, *Phdr.* 248c.

¹⁴ Petritsi II, 206, 204, 5–7: ხოლო შთამოვალსო ქმნისადმი და კუალად აღვალსო, ვითარ იტყოდა სოკრატი, ვითარ ფრთე-დაცვივნებულსო ფრინველი, პტეროროუსა. Trans. by Khubulava.

¹⁵ See Procl. *in Tim.* II 125,10–127,25.

catch up with the best in it, the One.¹⁶ The process of self-knowledge of the soul is therefore to be determined as a process of ascent, for in its recognition it is directed “upwards” within itself towards the cause. The soul desires what it has lost; it no longer has wings to follow the intellect. But it can find itself and, through this self-discovery, look for the first transcendent cause.

III. The meaning of *Love* for Proclus and Petritsi's hierarchical system

The One or the good, which is present in all of being and therefore in every single being, thus also in the soul, is reason enough to turn back to the One and the good. How does this return take place? The soul looks to the first cause of everything.¹⁷ The act of looking by the soul describes a state in which the soul enjoys what it sees. This state is best summarised and described by the Greek term ἐφίεσθαι. Petritsi translates ἐφίεσθαι¹⁸ into Georgian as *trpoba* (ტრფობა),¹⁹ which means the love and enjoyment of what the sighted sees in the seen. Petritsi himself describes *trpoba* as follows: “For love is nothing other than a condensation of the will to desire.”²⁰ The love expressed in the will of desire is *ukutrpoba* (უკუტრფობა),²¹ “return love,” which in

¹⁶ See Riggs (2015) 177–204; Steel (1998) 161–175

¹⁷ Cf. Mchedlidze (2000) 176–198 (in Georgian).

¹⁸ Proclus uses the term ἐφίεσθαι to show the desire towards goodness. See Procl. *PT* I 22, 102, 17–19; and *ibid.*, 24–26: Μήτε οὖν γνῶναι μήτε ἐλεῖν ὁ ποθεῖ δυνάμενα περὶ αὐτὸ πάντα χορεύει, καὶ ὠδίνει μὲν αὐτὸ καὶ οἶνο ἀπομαντεύεται, τὴν δὲ ἔφρουν ἀκατάληκτον ἔχει [...] καὶ τῇ μὲν κινήσει ταύτη καὶ τῇ ἐφέσει σφῆζει τὰ πάντα, τῇ δὲ ἀγνώστῳ τῶν ὄλων ὑπεροχῇ τὴν οἰκείαν ἔνωσιν ἄνωσιν ἄμικτον φυλάττει πρὸς τὰ δεύτερα. See also Mchedlidze (2000) 188.

¹⁹ See especially, Petritsi II 8; 15; 31; 34; as well as Mchedlidze (2000) 191–198.

²⁰ Petritsi, II, 31, 82, 9–10: რამეთუ სხუად არარად არს ტრფობაღებად თჳნიერ დაჴმობრება ნებას წადლოისას. Trans. by Khubulava.

²¹ Although the term return love seems to have been invented by Petritsi himself, Proclus also speaks about love and return in *in Alc.* 27, 1–2. The term ἐπιστρεπτικός also appears in Dionysios Areopagita. See Pseudo-Denys l'Aréopagita (2016), ed. Y. de Andia, here: IV, 10, 462, 30–34: Πᾶσιν οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἐφετὸν καὶ ἐραστὸν καὶ ἀγαπητὸν, καὶ δι' αὐτὸ καὶ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα καὶ τὰ ἦττω τῶν κρείττωνων ἐπιστρεπτικῶς ἐρῶσι καὶ κοινωνικῶς τὰ ὁμόστοιχα τῶν ὁμοταγῶν καὶ τὰ κρείττω τῶν ἦττωνων προνοητικῶς καὶ αὐτὰ ἑαυτῶν ἕκαστα συνεκτικῶς. Dionysius' name does not appear in Petritsi's commentary, but it can be assumed that Petritsi may have known Dionysius' works from Greek and Georgian translations. See Alexidze (2002) 128: “Dionysios Areopagita is not mentioned at

Greek is expressed as ἐπιστρεπτικῶς and is a synonym for return (ἐπιστροφή).²²

Proclus also speaks about the love of the cause in the *Platonic Theology* I, 25. In this work, he discusses the super-intellectual triad that leads to the good: Faith (πίστις), truth (ἀλήθεια), and love (ἔρωσ).²³ The relevance of the triad is explained by Plato as well as in the Chaldean writings. Proclus writes about this in *in Tim.*:

Proclus, *in Tim.* I 212, 19-22

He should preserve unshaken the right order of his acts towards the gods and set before himself virtues that purify him from the realm of generation and cause him to ascend, and also trust and truth and love, that renowned triad.²⁴ (tr. Runia/Share)

In the *Platonic Theology*, Proclus not only points to the *Chaldean Oracles* as the source of the super-intellectual triad, but he also mentions Plato's *Laws*.²⁵ Although Proclus gives the *Laws* as the source for the

all in Petritsi's commentary. Nevertheless, Petritsi may have known the works of Dionysius not only in the original Greek, but also from the Georgian tradition of the entire Corpus Dionysiacum, which had been translated into Georgian along with the (Pseudo)Maximus Scholia by Ephrem Mzire (11th century).” See also Mchedlidze (2000) 196. Mchedlidze thinks that the Georgian term *ukutrpoba* (უკუტრფობა) could correspond to the Greek ἐπι-ἔσθαι. Petritsi may have derived ἐπι-ἔσθαι from ἐφίεσθαι.

²² Cf. Petritsi, II, 12, 43, 34–44, 1: და კუალად რადთა მისდადვე უკუპ ოტრფობდეს და უკუ იქცეოდის მყოფი, ვითარცა თვისისა მანყარობლისა თუალისადმი. See also Petritsi, II, 34, 86, 10–11: ხოლო ესე ზენათა შორის გჳწყის, რომელ ყოველი უკუნქცევად და უკუნტრფობად მსგავსებისა მიერ აღესრულების.

²³ Procl. *PTI* 25, 112, 13–15: Ἀπὸ δὴ τούτων θεωρήσωμεν ἀλήθειαν αὐτὴν καὶ πίστιν καὶ ἔρωτα καὶ τὴν μίαν αὐτῶν κοινωνίαν αὐτῶ τῷ λογισμῷ συνέλωμεν; *ibid.* IV 9, 31, 6–8: Δοκεῖ δ' ἔμοιγε καὶ τὰς τρεῖς αἰτίας τὰς ἀναγωγούς ἰκανῶς ὁ Πλάτων ἐκφαίνειν τοῖς μὴ παρέργως ἀκούουσι τῶν λεγομένων, ἔρωτα καὶ ἀλήθειαν καὶ πίστιν.

²⁴ Procl. *in Tim.* I 212, 19–22: καὶ τὴν τάξιν τῶν θείων ἔργων ἀσάλευτον φυλάττειν ἀρετὰς τε ἀπὸ τῆς γενέσεως καθαρτικὰς καὶ ἀναγωγούς προβεβλήσθαι καὶ πίστιν καὶ ἀλήθειαν καὶ ἔρωτα, ταύτην ἐκείνην τὴν τριάδα. Trans. by Runia/Share (2008) 48.

²⁵ Procl. *PTI* 25, 112, 3–9: καὶ οὐχ ὑπ' ἐκείνων μόνον, ἀλλ' εἰ δεῖ τὰ δοκοῦντα λέγειν, καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἐν Νόμοις ἢ τῆς πίστεως ταύτης πρὸς τε τὴν ἀλήθειαν καὶ τὸν ἔρωτα συγγένεια κεκήρυκται. Cf. Plato, *Laws* V 730c: Ἀλήθεια δὴ πάντων μὲν ἀγαθῶν θεοῖς ἡγεῖται, πάντων δὲ ἀνθρώποις. Plato sets truth before all other virtues. See Sheppard (1982) 219.

triad, he does not agree with the Platonic view of the ordering. For Proclus understands faith differently from Plato. Plato speaks about faith as a lower level of the triad.²⁶ In contrast, Proclus presents it as the highest principle of the super-intellectual realm and compares it to the first *Teletarch*, the ruler of the three worlds in Chaldean cosmology.²⁷ Faith as the highest member of the super-intellectual triad is described by Proclus as follows:

Proclus, *PT IV* 9, 31, 11-16

And what else than faith is the cause of this ineffable muesis? For muesis in short, is neither through intelligence nor judgment, but through the uncial silence imparted by faith, which is better than every gnostic energy, and which establishes both whole souls and ours, in the ineffable and unknown nature of the Gods.²⁸ (tr. Taylor)

The first *Teletarch*, the ruler of the intelligent world, is named in the *Chaldean Oracles* as the “Leader of the Wings of Fire”. He is the source of all light as well as the ruler of the light of the sun.²⁹ For Proclus, therefore, faith belongs to the super-intellectual realm, which in the *Chaldean Oracles* is to be thought of as the power of theurgy (Θεουργική δύναμις). When Proclus speaks about the faith in the soul, he is talking about its power and its ability to unite with the One.³⁰ The

²⁶ Plato, *R.* VI 511e; cf. *Ti.* 29c3; 37b8.

²⁷ Cf. Majercik (1989) 11: „The Teletarchs are also associated with the Chaldean virtues of Faith (πίστις), Truth (ἀλήθεια), and Love (ἔρως), which function as faculties of the tree rulers: Faith is connected with the Material Teletarch; Truth with the Ethereal Teletarch; Love with the Empyrean Teletarch.”

²⁸ Procl. *PT IV* 9, 31, 11–16: Τί δὲ τὸ τῆς μύησεως ταύτης αἴτιον τῆς ἀρρήτου πλὴν τῆς πίστεως; Οὐ γὰρ διὰ νοήσεως οὐδὲ διὰ κρίσεως ὅλως ἡ μύησις, ἀλλὰ διὰ τῆς ἐνιαίας καὶ πάσης γνωστικῆς ἐνεργείας κρείττονος σιγῆς, ἣν ἡ πίστις ἐνδίδωσιν, ἐν τῷ ἀρρήτῳ καὶ ἀγνώστῳ <γένει> τῶν θεῶν ἰδρύουσα τὰς τε ὅλας ψυχὰς καὶ τὰς ἡμετέρας. Trans. by Taylor (1995) 250.

²⁹ Cf. Lewy (1978) 149.

³⁰ Cf. Procl. *PT I* 25, 112, 1–3: Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δήπου καὶ ἡ πρὸς αὐτὸ συναφή καὶ ἔνωσις ὑπὸ τῶν θεολόγων πίστις ἀποκαλεῖται. See also Proclus, *in Parm.* (2007-9) ed. Steel. Here: Procl. *in Parm.* 502, 24–29 (C. Steel): Aut non tale est hoc le credere quale in sensibilibus in aliis dicebamus, sed quale et theologi aiunt, quod *mansiue et intransuertibiliter primorum fide* seruatum aiunt *et ueritate et amore*, et le quale colligans nos et uniens ad unum. Credendum igitur talibus sermonibus, mansiuis ipsis utentem et incessibiliter, sed non opinabiliter et dubie ipsis attingentem.

faith within us is something mystical because it is connected with divine thinking.³¹ The particular characteristics at this level of the soul are silence and closed eyes. Proclus expresses with this symbolic meaning the overcoming of all difficulties in the ascent of the soul to the One. In this sense, the closed eyes, silence, and faith are to be understood as synonyms for the description of the super-intellectual state of the soul. The purpose of faith is the transference of the soul from the intelligible level to the One – as Proclus describes it in the commentary on *Alcibiades*: “The first founding the universe and establishing in the good.”³² Faith, in relation to truth and love, brings the soul to a better place, which Proclus also calls the mystical harbor.³³ Truth is thought of as the middle virtue between faith and love. While faith is presented as bringing the soul to goodness, truth makes knowledge appear in everything that exists.³⁴ Truth as an apparition of knowledge in being has an equally important meaning by Plato³⁵ as well as in the *Chaldean Oracles* and by Proclus. Proclus understands the meaning of truth as follows: “Just as the one that directs all the encosmic light from himself is called Helios, so too the one that directs the truth from himself is called Apollo.”³⁶ Helios is the god of light, and as the source of light, he is to be compared with good. Truth as the light of good is a companion of all that exists on the way to good itself. Without the light of the sun, the sun itself cannot be seen.³⁷ Both the light and the truth have the function of revealing and guiding to the sun and to goodness. Truth leads the soul to Wisdom (σοφία), which is a first super-being form of truth.

³¹ Cf. Procl. *PTI* 25, 110, 10: ἀλλ’ ἐπιδόντας ἑαυτοὺς τῷ θείῳ φωτί.

³² Procl. *in Alc.* 51, 16–52, 1: ἡ μὲν ἐδράζουσα τὰ πάντα καὶ ἐνιδρύουσα τῷ ἀγαθῷ. Trans. by O’Neill (1971) 33. Cf. Tornau (2006) 226, n. 116.

³³ “Mystic haven” or “mystic silence” are used synonymously by Proclus. See for this Procl. *PTIV* 9, 29, n.1.

³⁴ Cf. Procl. *in Alc.* 52, 1: ἡ δὲ ἐκφαίνουσα τὴν ἐν τοῖς οὐσιν ἅπασι γνῶσιν.

³⁵ See Plato, *R.* VII 517c: ἔν τε ὀρατῷ φῶς καὶ τὸν τούτου κύριον τεκοῦσα, ἔν τε νοητῷ αὐτῇ κυρία ἀλήθειαν καὶ νοῦν παρασχομένη, καὶ ὅτι δεῖ ταύτην ἰδεῖν τὸν μέλλοντα ἐμφρόνως πράξεν ἢ ἰδία ἢ δημοσία.

³⁶ Proclus, *in Cart.* (1908) ed. Pasquali. Here: Procl. *in Crat.* 78, 23–25: Ὅτι ὡσπερ ὁ τὸ ἐγκόσμιον πᾶν φῶς ἀφ’ ἑαυτοῦ χορηγῶν Ἥλιος καλεῖται, οὕτως καὶ ὁ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀφ’ ἑαυτοῦ χορηγῶν Ἀπόλλων καλεῖται. Trans. by Duvick (2007) 78.

³⁷ *Chaldean Oracles* (1971) ed. des Places. Here: *Or. Chald.* IV, 209, 27–29: ἐπεὶ καὶ ὀφθαλμὸς οὐκ ἄλλως ὀρᾷ τὸν ἥλιον ἢ γενόμενος ἡλιοειδῆς, ἀλλ’ οὐ τῷ ἐκ πυρὸς φωτί.

The third virtue is love. Love, as well as the first two virtues, has the function of bringing everything that exists to the super-intellectual realm:

Proclus, *in Alc.* 33, 3–7

so also the souls that have chosen the life of love are moved by the god who is the “guardian of beautiful youths” to the care of noble natures, and from apparent beauty they are elevated to the divine, taking up with them their darlings, and turning both themselves and their beloved towards beauty itself.³⁸ (tr. O’Neill)

Love is a kind of ὄχημα for the soul, which leads it towards the first beauty (κάλλος). One can read about this in *in Alc.*: “Now the souls that are possessed by love and share in the inspiration therefrom, using apparent beauty with vehicle undefiled, are turned towards intelligible beauty and set that end to their activity.”³⁹ Love is understood in the *Chaldean Oracles* as a supreme intelligible energy. For the Chaldeans, love is created by the paternal intellect. It is the energy of order that orders all the planets and stars.⁴⁰ Proclus writes about this in *in Parm.*:

Proclus, *in Parm.* 769, 6–9

Combined simultaneously by the bond of “that wonderful god, Eros,” who, according to the Oracle, sprang forth first out of Intellect, his unifying fire clothed with fire, to mix the mixing-bowls from the Source, directing towards them the bloom of his fire.⁴¹ (tr. Morrow/Dillon)

Love as a supracosmic and paternal energy creates an order within the cosmic bodies. Proclus grasps love as a moving energy within us, because the love within us humans has the power to ascend and desire

³⁸ Procl. *in Alc.* 33, 3–7: αἱ τὸν ἐρωτικὸν βίον ἐλόμεναι ψυχαὶ κινουῦνται μὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ τῶν καλῶν παίδων ἐφόρου πρὸς τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν τῶν εὖ πεφυκότων, ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ φαινομένου κάλλους ἀνάγονται πρὸς τὸ θεῖον κάλλος καὶ μεθ’ ἑαυτῶν ἀνάγουσι τὰ παιδικὰ καὶ ἐπιστρέφουσιν ἑαυτοῦς τε καὶ τοὺς ἐρωμένους ἐπ’ αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν. Trans. by O’Neill (1971) 21.

³⁹ Procl. *in Alc.* 33, 11–13: αἱ μὲν οὖν κάτοχοι τῷ ἔρωτι ψυχαὶ καὶ μετέχουσαι τῆς ἐκεῖθεν ἐπιπνοίας ἀχράντῳ ὀχήματι χρώμεναι τῷ φαινομένῳ κάλλει περιάγονται πρὸς τὸ νοητὸν κάλλος. Trans. by O’Neill (1971) 21.

⁴⁰ See Lewy (1978) 346–347.

⁴¹ Procl. *in Parm.* 769, 6–9: δεσμῷ Ἔρωτος ἀγητοῦ, κατὰ τὸ Λόγιον, ὃς ἐκ νόου ἔκθορε πρῶτος ἐσσάμενος πυρὶ πῦρ συνδέσμιον, ὄφρα κεράσῃ πηγαίους κρατήρας, εὐὸ πυρὸς ἄνθος ἐπισχῶν. Trans. by Morrow/Dillon (1987) 135.

to the super-intellectual level.⁴² Plato writes in the *Symposium* that love is a great demon (Δαίμων μέγας) that mediates between gods and humans.⁴³

It is difficult to say whether Petritsi was considering the *Platonic Theology* when he wrote about love for the first cause. He does, however, use a passage from Plato's *Phaedrus* as the textual basis for understanding love:

Petritsi, II, 8, 34, 20–23

Socrates says about the transcendent and unattainable One that It stirs the desire of all lovers towards Itself and gives them Its properties, puts in them and intention for grasping and obtaining It, makes the beings drunk with nectar and fixes their acmes by *ambrosia*.⁴⁴ (tr. Gigineishvili)

The drunkenness by the nectar by Plato is, for Petritsi, a metaphor for our becoming “drunk” through the goodness of the One. It is the state in which we love the good within us. The love of the good within us is love of self,⁴⁵ since the good within us is nothing other than the best of us. In this context, self-love does not have a pejorative connotation; it is both the motivation for self-knowledge and the desire for the good within us. The good within us, in turn, is, on one hand, identical to ourselves, but on the other hand, it is also different from ourselves. For as a reflection of the goodness of the One itself, the good within us is better and different than we ourselves are as a whole. The desire for the good within us is, however, the cause of self-knowledge and the knowledge

⁴² See Majercik (1989) 16.

⁴³ Plato, *Smp.* 202d–203a; and to this Armstrong (1961) 105–121.

⁴⁴ Petritsi, II, 8, 34, 19–23: ხოლო სათვთთაცა ჰკადრებს სოკრატე მას ზესთანა მიუწუდომელსა, იტყვს: იტრფობს და მისცემსო თვთებათა თვსთა ყოველთა მეტრფე მეწადთა თვსთა, დაუჰაზრავსო რეც თუ შეპყრობად და თანმიღებად თვსდა, დაათრობსო მყოფთა ნეკტართა მიერ, დაამტკიცებს აკმეთა მათთა ამვრო ამვროსიადთა. Trans. by Gigineishvili (2007) 213. This quotation points to a possible combination of Plato, *Phdr.* 247e, and Procl. *PT* IV 15, 46, 14–47, 6, on the part of Petritsi; see also Gigineishvili (2007) 60–63.

⁴⁵ Cf. Plotinus, *Enn.* VI 5, 1, 17–21: ἡ δ' ἀρχαία φύσις καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ὅπερ ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ, εἰς ἔν ὄντως ἄγει, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο σπεύδει πᾶσα φύσις, ἐφ' ἑαυτήν. τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τῆ μιᾷ ταύτῃ φύσει τὸ εἶναι αὐτῆς καὶ εἶναι αὐτῆ· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ εἶναι μίαν. οὐτωδὲ ἀγαθὸν ὀρθῶς εἶναι λέγεται οἰκείον·

of the other within us.⁴⁶ Petritsi believes that the good within us can be achieved through the power of love.⁴⁷ Love is understood by both Proclus and Petritsi as something divine. Proclus writes as follows:

Proclus, *in Parm.* 511, 27-31

Even the divine Intellect, as I have said before, does not know the One by direct vision (i.e. intuitively) or intellectually, but is united with it, “drunk with its nectar” (*Symp.* 203b), for its nature, and what is in it, is better than all knowledge.⁴⁸ (tr. Morrow/Dillon)

Petritsi describes the soul that has fallen in love as Dionysian.⁴⁹ The expression of the soul as Dionysian describes precisely that state in which it is drunk, as it were, by love from the nectar of the first good and desires to return to it again: “through a Dionysian frenzy of eros and desire towards the One.”⁵⁰

When we talk about the love of the One and the Good, the question is whether the All of the Caused is in turn loved by the One and the Good. Petritsi's answer is: “But what should the first goodness love, when it is

⁴⁶ See Alexidze (2014)11–33.

⁴⁷ Cf. Petritsi, II, 15, 49, 31–32: ყოველი უკუნძქვევი ამის თვსზორისისა ერთისა სიყუარულითა უკუნ იქცევის.

⁴⁸ Procl. *in Parm.* 511, 27–31: quoniam et diivinus intellectus non epulitice, id est iniectice, ut dictum est michi et prius, neque intellectualiter cognoscit le unum, sed unitus est ad ipsum, inebriatus nectare; natura quedam et que in ipso melius cognitione. Trans. by Morrow/Dillon (1987) 593. See also Procl. *in Parm.* 1047, 19–23: Μεθύουσα δε, ὡς τίς φησι, τῷ νέκταρι καὶ γεννώσα τὴν ὄλην γνῶσιν καθ' ὅσον ἐστὶν ἄνθος τοῦ νοῦ καὶ ὑπερούσιος ἐνάς; Plotinus, *Enn.* V 8, 10, 29–37: ἐκεῖ δὲ χροά ἢ ἐπανθοῦσα κάλλος ἐστι, μᾶλλον δὲ πᾶν χροά καὶ κάλλος ἐκ βάθους· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλο τὸ καλὸν ὡς ἐπανθοῦν. ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὴ ὄλον ὄρωσιν ἢ προσβολῇ μόνη ἐνομίσθη, τοῖς δὲ διὰ παντὸς οἶον οἰνωθεῖσι καὶ πληρωθεῖσι τοῦ νέκταρος, ἅτε δι' ὄλης τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ κάλλους ἐλθόντος, οὐ θεαταῖς μόνον ὑπάρχει γενέσθαι. οὐ γὰρ ἔτι τὸ μὲν ἔξω, τὸ δ' αὖ τὸ θεώμενον ἔξω, ἀλλ' ἔχει τὸ ὄξῆωσ ὄρων ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ ὀρώμενον.

⁴⁹ For the expression “become Dionysian” see Petritsi, II, 12, 44, 5; *ibid.*, 13, 45, 19; also Alexidze (2008) 108. Petritsi uses the expression “soul become Dionysian” in the Plotinian context, i.e. for the soul that has become in love and desires back to the good. See Plotinus, *Enn.* VI 7, 22, 7-10: Καὶ τοῖσιν ψυχῇ λαβοῦσα εἰς αὐτὴν τὴν ἐκεῖθεν ἀπορροῆν κινεῖται καὶ ἀναβακχεύεται καὶ οἷστρον πίμπλαται καὶ ἔρωσ γίνεται. Plotinus and Petritsi understand the soul in love as one that turns back to the cause.

⁵⁰ Petritsi, II, 63, 129, 4–9: ვითარცა გადვინისებული ტრფიალუბითა მიერ სურვილთა ერთისათა. Trans. by Gigineishvili (2007) 211.

itself the object of love for all, and the [goal] of return, and the source of beings' desire, and [for all others] the sorrowful desire for the satisfaction of the show."⁵¹ So far, it is clear that the beloved is always better and more perfect than the lover and therefore the cause of loving. The relationships of cause and caused, as well as of beloved and loved, are thus equally asymmetrical. That is, the lover loves the beloved, but not vice versa. The love of the One is the reason for returning to oneself and to the one within oneself. Petritsi says the following about this:

Petritsi, II, 15, 49, 19–35

You should know that when a being loves the supreme being, it first of all embraces its own inner being in order to find that cause which is contained within itself, and the self-one. Through its cause, which is the one that is within itself, [the being] puts itself in contact with the supreme Sun – the One, as Socrates demonstrates it in Phaedrus saying that when the soul embraces its own substance, it first coincides with all plurality of beings and their diversity. But when it goes deeper into itself, it sheds the particularities of the forms and even puts off its own substance. First it embraces God and the One in itself, and thereby the ineffable Sun of the Henads.⁵² (tr. Khubulava)

The soul loves and desires the One as the first cause and source of All. This desire is a process within the soul that turns to the causes within it and to the one within it. The love of the One would not be possible if it

⁵¹ Petritsi, II, 10, 38, 19–23: რამეთუ ყოველი სრული სრულ მყოფელსა თვსსა ეტრფვის, ხოლო პირველი კეთილობად ვისლამცა ეტრფოდა, რამეთუ იგი არს ყოველთა სატრფოდ და უკუნ საქცევი და საწყური არსთა წადილისად და ღმობად ხედვათა დაცხრომისად. Trans. by Khubulava

⁵² Petritsi, II, 15, 49, 19–29: აღიუწყე, რამეთუ ოდეს ეტრფობოდის არსი ზესთ არსს, პირველად თვსთა ყოველთა შინაგანთა შეიარებს, რადთა პოვოს თვს-შორისი და მიზეზი თვთერთი. ვინად მის მიზეზისა მიერ თვსისა, რომელ არს მის-შორისი ერთი, შეეყოფვის მას ზესთათა მზესა ერთსა, ვითარცა აღმოაჩენს სოკრატი «ფედროსა» შორის, რამეთუ იტყვს, ვითარმედ «შერადარებდეს სული თვსისა არსებისადმი, პირველად დაემთხუევის არსთა ყოველთა სიმრავლესა, და მრავალსახეობასა მყოფთასა. ხოლო ვითარ დაიღრომსრე, მერმე განაგდებს თითოგუარობასა გუარათასა და თვთ თვსსაცა არსებასა აღიძრცვსო». და მოეხუევის პირველად თვს-შორისსა ღმერთსა და ერთსა, და მერე მის მიერ მას გამოუსიტყუსა მზესა ერთთასა. Trans. by Khubulava.

were not present on any level of being. Here, Petritsi interprets Plato's *Parmenides*⁵³:

Petritsi, II, 39, 92, 24–31

For, according to *Parmenides*, everything that has form is a being. And every being desires its own form. The desire [of the being] for the form is the desire for its One, for every form is some One. The desire for its own One, as well as for the One that is in the [form], is [again] the desire for and love towards, the transcendent One. Therefore, it is clear that everything that loves and desires its [own] One, which is the Being of all, [at the same time] desires the most sublime One. So it is with the being that is pure being.⁵⁴ (tr. Khubulava)

The return of the soul or the desire towards the One would not be possible without self-knowledge. Petritsi writes about the soul's self-knowledge as follows

Petritsi, II, 17, 52, 4–9

For example, when the soul recognizes something, it is not the case that the soul returns back from the outer objects – it is a characteristic of mortal beings to perceive only and not understand – but when the soul understands something, it evokes its innate ideas and finds the meaning of the outside object with itself.⁵⁵ (tr. Gidineishvili)

⁵³ Cf. Plato, *Parm.* 141e–142a.

⁵⁴ Petritsi, II, 39, 92, 24–31: რამეთუ გაგუარებულ ყოველი მყოფი, იტყვს პარმენიდი. ხოლო თითოეულისგან მყოფთადასა წადილი თვისსა გუარისადა არს. ხოლო წადილი გუარისადა წადილ თვისსა ერთისადა არს, რამეთუ ერთ ვიდრემე ყოველი გუარი. ხოლო წადილი თვისსა და მის-შორისსა ერთისადა წადილ და ტრფიალება არს ზესთ ერთისა მის. ვინადა ამის მიერ საცნაურ, რომელ ყოველი მეტრფე და მეწადე თვისსა ერთისადა, რომელ არს მყოფობადა თითოულისადა, მის ზესთ ერთისა არს მეწადე. და ესე მყოფობითისა აობისათვს. Trans. by Khubulava.

⁵⁵ Petritsi, II, 17, 52, 4–9: მოიღე სახედ, რამეთუ ოდეს რაა გაიგონოს სულმან, არა თუ გარეთაგან უკუნ იქცევის და მიიღებს განაგონსა; ნუ იყოფინ, რამეთუ ესე მოკუდავთადა არს ოდენ გრძნობადა და არ გაგონებადა. რამეთუ, სულმან რაა გაიგონოსო თვისი გასაგონოდ, აღსძრავსო თვის-შორისთა სიტყუათა არსთასა, იტყვს სოკრატი, და მას გარეთსა ჰაზრსა გასაგონსა პირველად თვის შორის ჰპობესო, ვითარ სიტყუადა და ბჭე არსთადა. Trans. by Gidineishvili (2007) 193.

Petritsi understands soul knowledge in a similar way to Proclus: the soul knows itself when it returns to itself.⁵⁶ Moreover, Petritsi emphasizes that the soul does not know itself from the outside towards itself, because this would be equal only to the sense perception and would be no knowledge. Rather, the soul first finds the meaning of everything within itself. This principle of inwardness of soul knowledge works as follows: The seed of the one within the soul is a motivation for the soul's ascent. Ascension is a process in which the soul, through self-knowledge, becomes more and more identical with itself and approaches the causes within it. On the way to the One, the soul throws away its physical passions like ballast, unites in this way more and more with itself and becomes similar to the one within it. The ascent of the soul can be understood at the same time as escape from the body, so that it does not take on physical features. However, the body is not able to make the soul mortal, because it is still lower and more imperfect than the soul descended in it:

Petritsi, II, 187, 195, 4–11

Remember that the being of the soul is far above the acquired and changeable passions. For its being is not composed of the corporeal elements, nor is it affected by the corporeal qualities, nor does it change with them, as can be observed with everything that is composed. Because it does not experience any effects on the part of the body. If it were to experience any changeable effects, it would also receive the complete mortality of its being.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ Cf. Procl. *in Tim.* II 286, 26–287, 1: και ἐλέγομεν [p. 244, 17], ὅτι διὰ τῆς εἰς κύκλον περιαγωγῆς ἐπιστρέψας αὐτὴν πρὸς αὐτὴν γνωστικὴν ἑαυτῆς ἀπετέλεσε. Τοῦτο τοίνυν ἐν τούτοις σαφέστερον ἐδήλωσεν· ἐγχειρήσας γὰρ εἰπεῖν, ὅπως γινώσκει τὰ πάντα, στρέφεσθαι φησὶν αὐτὴν εἰς ἑαυτὴν καὶ στρεφομένην ἄρξασθαι βίον διαζῆν ἔμφρονα καὶ νοερόν. Αὐτόθεν οὖν δῆλον, ὅτι ἢ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ἐπιστροφὴ γνῶσις ἐστὶν ἑαυτῆς καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ πάντων καὶ τῶν πρὸ αὐτῆς καὶ τῶν ἀπ' αὐτῆς·

⁵⁷ Petritsi, II, 187, 195, 4–11: შეისწავე, ვითარმედ არსებად სულისად ყოვლითურთ ზესთ დაუშთების შედგომითთა და ქცევითთა ვნებათა, რამეთუ არცა კავშირთა მიერ სხეულებრთა შედგა მყოფობად მისი და არცა სხეულებრივთა რომელობათა მიერ ივნებს რას და თან შეიცვალეზის, ვითარ ესე ყოველთა შედგმულთა შორის განიცდების. რამეთუ ყოვლითურთ უთავსდებო არს რააზომვე სხეულებრივთა ვნებათა მითუალვად. რამეთუ თუმცა რააზომვე მიითუალვიდა ზღრომის სახეთაცა ვნებათა, სრულეზბითმცა ზედ მიიხდიდა ხრწნასა არსებისა თვსისასა. Trans. By Khubulava

Here, of course, the hierarchical principle of causality comes to mind. From the point of view that the cause is always better than the caused,⁵⁸ the cause cannot depend on the caused. Due to this one-sided dependency relation, the caused cannot become identical with itself without catching up with its cause. That is, to become identical with oneself means to love oneself as well as the cause of the self and of being as a whole.

IV. Conclusion

Everything that comes from the One is based on a causal system of cause and caused. It is important to point out two conditions for the whole causal system to work. Firstly, there must be a first cause that is fundamentally different and better than everything else, and second, the first cause must be both beyond everything else and present in every caused. For both Proclus and Petritsi, the first cause, the one within the soul, can be understood as the first impulse for the beginning of the ascension process. In order for a philosophical path to the One to become apparent, it is necessary to present the desire to return to the One through the one within the soul. Returning to the One would not be possible without the love the caused towards the cause; the love of the soul towards the One is central to both Proclus and Petritsi, and both understand love in the same way. It is the power of the soul to desire the best. The difference in outlook that we may see between Proclus and Petritsi is that for Proclus a mystical union of the soul with the One is possible, even if it is a momentary union. Petritsi does not speak of this mystical union of the soul with the One; it seems that for him love towards the One is an urge and a desire to see or to seek what cannot be seen with the physical eye. But it is the best not only in itself, but also in the soul, and therefore it is impossible not to desire it. It can be said that for Petritsi, the One always remains an object of desire, for which the soul always yearns.

⁵⁸ See Procl. *ET Prop.* 7, Dodds 8, 1–2: Πᾶν τὸ παρακτικὸν ἄλλου κρείττον ἐστὶ τῆν τοῦ παραγομένου φύσεως.

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